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Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice?
Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law Design
LEIGH OSOFSKY†
INTRODUCTION
Taxpayers who want to reduce their tax liability
through tax planning face a dilemma. In order to do so, they
often must bear costs that seem, at first glance, to have
nothing to do with getting the desirable tax result. For
example, imagine that an accounting firm approaches the
tax director of a major corporation and explains that, by
entering into a complex tax planning scheme, the tax
director can reduce the corporation’s tax liability by a
whopping $500 million. The accounting firm explains that
the only real catch is that in order to get this incredible tax
benefit under the tax law, the corporation must subject
itself to undesirable business risk.1 The tax director agrees
to enter the corporation into the scheme, subjects it to the
undesirable business risk, and obtains the incredible tax
savings. Efficiency-minded academics see a puzzle with this
situation. Why should the desirable tax result be
conditioned upon bearing undesirable business risk? In
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to
thank Ben Alarie, Bill Blatt, Caroline Corbin, David Gamage, Frances Hill,
Jason Oh, Zachary Osofsky, Emily Satterthwaite, Daniel Shaviro, David
Weisbach, and participants at the James Hausman Tax Law and Policy
Workshop Series at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the 2012 Junior
Tax Faculty Workshop at UC Hastings, the University of Miami School of Law
2012 Junior Faculty Workshop, the Florida International University School of
Law Faculty Workshop, and the Law and Society Association 2013 Annual
Meeting for helpful comments or discussions. I would also like to thank Barbara
Brandon for excellent research assistance. Any errors are my own.
1. Readers familiar with the frictions literature will recognize this scenario
as akin to that posed by Daniel N. Shaviro in Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic
Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221,
223 (2000) [hereinafter Shaviro, Economic Substance]. Shaviro’s discussion of
frictions will be examined in more detail at the text accompanying notes 41 and
47.
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particular, since the corporation is worse off, and no one is
better off, as a result of the corporation bearing the
undesirable business risk, the business risk requirement
itself appears to be ill-conceived.2
Prominent economists and tax scholars have answered
this question by developing the compelling and important
theory of “frictions.” According to this theory, tax law relies
on frictions, or nontax costs, in order to make tax planning
more expensive. The goal is to deter these transactions,
which are viewed as socially wasteful.3 Under this theory, at
least with respect to the tax law,4 a friction serves no useful
role, other than to deter the tax planning. For example, in
the case discussed above, business risk would be a good
friction if it stopped the tax director from entering into the
scheme. It would be a bad friction if the tax director went
through with the scheme, albeit after taking on the
undesirable business risk. This focus on the deterrence
aspect of frictions has caused scholars to generally agree
upon two pieces of conventional wisdom regarding frictions.
Good frictions should (1) deter tax planning rather than
cause it to continue in a more wasteful fashion, and (2) not
impose costs on regular business transactions.5
In this Article, I argue that frictions serve a more
extensive and complex role than has been recognized
previously. Although not focused on in the tax literature,
frictions function first as screening mechanisms, by
tracking underlying characteristics of taxpayers and
imposing different costs on different groups. A large body of
literature regarding optimal tax theory addresses screening

2. See id.
3. David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1312, 1315-16 & n.5 (2001) [hereinafter Schizer, Frictions as a
Constraint].
4. The friction may be valuable for reasons having nothing to do with the
tax law. See, e.g., id. at 1338 (explaining how frictions, such as a taxpayer’s
desire to engage in public trading, can serve important nontax functions and
that reformers should be careful not to undermine frictions that serve similarly
important nontax functions).
5. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 45-50.
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taxpayers.6 At base (and as explained in more detail in Part
II), screening mechanisms in the optimal tax context track
characteristics indicative of ability and impose greater costs
on high ability taxpayers trying to obtain low tax rates or
other benefits, in order to target the low rates or benefits
more accurately to low ability taxpayers. Scholars have not
yet connected this literature with their understanding of
frictions, because tax scholarship has not conceived of tax
planning as a screening problem. This Article makes the
connection, exploring how tax planning presents a similar
(and related) screening problem, and how frictions serve as
screening mechanisms. The tax system must screen
between tax planners and non-planners and then deter tax
planners, in order to preserve revenue, fairness, and
efficiency. When frictions are designed appropriately as
screening mechanisms on tax planning, they do so by
tracking characteristics of tax planners and imposing
greater costs on them.
Recognizing
how
frictions
screen
complicates
conventional wisdom and suggests a more robust framework
for the design of frictions throughout the tax law. In
particular, understanding how frictions function as
screening mechanisms reveals that a friction that deters tax
planning rather than causes it to continue in a more
wasteful fashion may nonetheless be a failed friction and
that imposing costs on regular business transactions is not
always a flaw. Instead, the key inquiry is whether a friction
imposes differential, and greater, costs on tax planners,
relative to non-planners, thereby reducing the overall social
costs from tax planning. This inquiry suggests a broader
framework for evaluating frictions. First, frictions must
impose greater costs on tax planners than non-planners.
Second, as to tax planners, the friction must deter tax
planning, rather than causing it to continue in a more
wasteful fashion. Third, the benefits from the first two steps
(from increased efficiency and lower tax liability for nonplanners) must outweigh costs that taxpayers bear as a
result of the friction.

6. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 63-83.
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This new framework can lead to concrete improvements
in many different types of frictions. It can help sharpen the
screening capacity of existing frictions that already serve as
promising screening mechanisms. For example, the socalled wash sale rule7 does a reasonable job of identifying
characteristics likely to correlate well with tax planning
motivation and imposing greater costs on taxpayers more
likely engaged in such planning. As a result, the wash sale
rule is designed reasonably as a screening mechanism for
tax planning (even though, as scholars have pointed out, it
may not do a great job actually deterring such planning).8
However, viewing frictions as screening mechanisms can
help improve the wash sale rule, by targeting costs more
appropriately to tax planners.
This framework can also help reveal and rethink
potentially undesirable frictions. Unlike the wash sale rule,
other frictions in the tax system systematically impose
higher costs on taxpayers based on characteristics other
than tax planning motivation, in a manner that ultimately
may undermine the desirability of the friction. For example,
the so-called use-it-or-lose-it rule for flexible spending
accounts9 is a friction. The use-it-or-lose-it rule arguably
may serve as a powerful means of deterring tax planning.
However, the use-it-or-lose-it rule imposes particularly high
costs on taxpayers who are less sophisticated decision
makers and on those taxpayers with lower marginal tax
rates.10 Systematically imposing higher costs on taxpayers
who are less sophisticated decision makers or who face
lower marginal tax rates is difficult to defend at best and
highly perverse at worst.11 Viewing frictions as screening
mechanisms is essential to recognizing these perversities
and charting a path toward reform.

7. I.R.C. § 1091 (2006).
8. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules, TAXES, Mar.
2004, at 67, 67 [hereinafter Schizer, Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules].
9. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(c), 72 Fed. Reg. 43937, 43957 (Aug. 6, 2007).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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Finally, this framework can help analyze the utility of
prospective frictions. For example, scholars often discuss
tax law uncertainty as a promising friction to deter tax
planning. However, tax law uncertainty fails entirely as a
screening mechanism on tax planning because it does not
target tax planners in particular. Applying the screening
framework can suggest ways to make tax law uncertainty a
more targeted friction on tax planning. In short, viewing
frictions as screening mechanisms complicates basic
assumptions about the design of frictions, provides a
broader framework to think about how to craft successful
frictions, and, therefore, offers concrete improvements to
existing tax law.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the
current understanding of frictions and the social waste
framework that underlies this analysis. Part II explores
screening mechanisms in optimal tax theory. Part III
explains how tax planning presents a similar, and related,
screening problem to that set forth in optimal tax theory.
Part IV explains how frictions serve as screening
mechanisms, how this insight has conceptual importance for
the design of tax law, and how the conceptual lessons
should translate into concrete tax law reform. The
Conclusion describes potential future lines of research.
I. EXISTING FRICTIONS LITERATURE
This Part provides background regarding the existing
frictions literature, to which this Article responds. The
concept of frictions grows out of an important strain of tax
scholarship, grounded in efficiency, which generally views
tax planning as a form of social waste. As a result, this Part
begins first by defining tax planning, as understood in the
frictions literature, and by briefly explaining the efficiency
mode of analysis and the assumption that tax planning is
socially wasteful. This Part then describes the existing
frictions literature, its focus on deterrence, and the
resulting conventional wisdom regarding frictions.
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A. Tax Planning and Social Waste
As an initial matter, while tax planning could be
defined very broadly to include any activity designed to
reduce taxation,12 when discussing “tax planning,” the
existing frictions literature and, as a result, this Article,
focuses on a narrower set of activity. Specifically, the
frictions literature focuses on planning transactions in order
to reduce tax liability, including through the postponement
of taxes, tax arbitrage across taxpayers subject to different
tax rates, and tax arbitrage across streams of income
subject to different tax rates.13 The frictions literature does
not tend to focus on underlying behavioral changes designed
to reduce taxation, such as substitutions of leisure for labor.
The frictions literature is set within a prominent line of
tax scholarship, rooted in economics, which examines tax
law design with efficiency as a major criterion.14 Efficiency
12. The economics literature sometimes distinguishes between different types
of behavioral responses designed to reduce tax liability: real shifts in underlying
behavior in response to tax (such as a switch from work to leisure); avoidance
activity (or investing time and resources in order to find legal ways, other than
through changes in underlying behavior, to reduce tax liability); and evasion
activity. E.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the
Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 INT’L MONETARY FUND (“IMF”) STAFF
PAPERS 172, 178 (1996). Defined broadly, tax planning could fit within all of
these categories and sometimes within multiple categories at the same time.
13. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The General Theory of Tax Avoidance, 38
NAT’L TAX J. 325, 325 (1985). Some might simply refer to this behavior as “tax
avoidance” (and indeed Stiglitz does). In this Article, I refrain from doing so
because much of the frictions literature uses the term “tax planning” (to refer to
the types of tax planning transactions referred to in the text), see, for example,
Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 233 (2010)
(explaining that the “thrust of this tax-planning literature is that frictions can
be a powerful constraint and should be used as a regulatory tool to combat
wasteful tax planning”), and to avoid some of the tricky issues that accompany
the “tax avoidance” label, see, for example, Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at
Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for International Trade and Tax Law, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 44 (2010) [hereinafter Benshalom, New Poor at Our Gates]
(discussing futility of attempts to define tax avoidance).
14. This is not to say that scholars working with efficiency are unconcerned
with other questions, such as equity and distribution. Rather, equity and
distribution are central concerns, which are often bracketed in considering the
design of the tax law (or the tax base). Sometimes this is done “to simplify and
clarify the analysis.” See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of
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analysis focuses on minimizing the “social cost” of taxation.15
In particular, efficiency-minded scholars tend to concentrate
on one particular social cost of taxation, the so-called
“deadweight loss” from taxation.16
Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L.
REV. 1, 4 (1992) [hereinafter Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization].
Sometimes this is done under the belief that non-efficiency considerations, such
as distribution, are best dealt with by adjusting the rate schedule, whereas
efficiency considerations should dominate the design of the tax base. See, e.g.,
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1676-79 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line Drawing].
15. Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX
L. REV. 229, 229 (2011). The social cost of taxation includes a variety of costs,
including the administrative and compliance costs of the tax system, as well as
the deadweight losses from taxpayers shifting their behavior (through
substitution, avoidance, and evasion activities) to reduce the tax liability they
have to pay. Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki included all of these social costs
of taxation in their explication of the marginal efficiency cost of funds (“MECF”).
Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 12. As a result, scholars have at least nominally
begun to take the full array of social costs of taxation into account in their
analyses. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 90-94 (2008) (discussing administration and enforcement); Alex
Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 601, 649-50 (2007) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, Cost of Norms] (raising,
though not ultimately applying, MECF analysis); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 569, 637-38 (2006) (same); Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency
Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 514-18
(2004) [hereinafter Schenk, An Efficiency Approach] (examining all of the costs
set forth by Slemrod and Yitzhaki); Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 14, at
1665-68 (applying MECF, though not formally incorporating administrative
costs). However, the deadweight loss from taxpayers shifting their behavior in
response to taxation remains a primary focus of the efficiency analysis. See, e.g.,
David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1353-54 (2000) [hereinafter Schizer, Sticks
and Snakes] (citing to MECF, albeit to focus on likelihood of engaging in
planning to avoid tax, rather than to focus on administrative and compliance
issues).
16. See, e.g., Schenk, An Efficiency Approach, supra note 15, at 514-18;
Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization, supra note 14, at 4; Weisbach,
Line Drawing, supra note 14, at 1650-51. While much of tax scholarship now
incorporates the efficiency criteria, the cited works provide relatively extensive
discussions in the legal literature of efficiency in tax law. The public finance
literature serves as a source of much of the more technical development of the
efficiency criteria. For basic public finance texts, see, for example, HARVEY
ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (6th ed 2002); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (3rd ed. 2000). For this point in particular, see, for example,

1064

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

The cost to taxpayers of changing their behavior so as to
reduce or avoid their tax liability is the deadweight loss
from taxation.17 This deadweight loss can best be
understood as follows. Imagine that, if a taxpayer engages
in her preferred behavior (for example, working), the tax
law imposes a tax liability on this activity. When the
taxpayer works and pays the tax liability, the payment is
simply a transfer of wealth from the taxpayer to the
recipients of the payment (the government and, through the
government, other members of society). On a net basis,
society is not better or worse off by the transfer. What the
paying taxpayer has lost, the recipients of the payment have
gained. However, imagine instead that the taxpayer
changes her behavior so as to avoid the tax liability. For
example, she engages in less preferred behavior (such as
leisure), which is untaxed, in order to avoid the tax that
would otherwise apply. The taxpayer is now better off by
the tax not paid. However, this is offset by the loss of the
tax revenue to the intended recipients of the tax payment.
Thus, no societal net gain exists. In fact, society is worse off
because the taxpayer has adopted a less preferred behavior
to avoid the tax, which makes her worse off, relative to a
world without taxation. Consequently, the cost to her of
changing her behavior is a societal net cost, or deadweight
loss, from taxation.18
Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 61, 67 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 1985); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 310 (4th ed. 1984) (describing how deadweight loss
results because an individual will “seek to be a free rider and avoid tax payment
by buying or selling less of the taxed product”).
17. See Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 14, at 1650-51 (describing
deadweight loss in the context of consumer and producer surplus).
18. See id. at 1650-52. The analysis gets a bit more complicated. The
taxpayer will change behavior in response to taxation for two reasons: (1)
because taxation changes the relative prices of various commodities and/or
activities (i.e., working becomes more expensive and leisure becomes less
expensive, encouraging the taxpayer to engage in more leisure), and (2) because
taxation reduces an individual’s spending capacity, which should cause a change
in behavior (for example, by causing the taxpayer to work more to make up for
taxes paid). Id. at 1652-53. These two responses are referred to, respectively, as
(1) the substitution effect and (2) the income effect. Id. at 1653-54. The example
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Efficiency-minded scholars have concluded that the
deadweight loss from taxation includes not just changes in
taxpayers’ underlying behavior (such as substituting leisure
for work) to avoid taxation, but also includes tax planning.
While the assumption regarding the deadweight loss from
tax planning is prevalent in much tax scholarship,19 David
Weisbach has most prominently made the formal argument
in the legal literature that, as a general matter, tax
planning is socially wasteful.20 This includes both the cost to
taxpayers of engaging in less desirable activity and any out
of pocket costs they incur to engage in the planning (such as

in the text (and often efficiency analysis generally) focuses on the substitution
effect. For an interesting perspective regarding problems with focusing on the
substitution effect, see, for example, Sugin, supra note 15, at 231-37.
19. Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of
Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 22-24 (2012)
(“Scholars generally conclude that the ability of taxpayers to select their tax
treatment by arranging their business affairs in particular ways is detrimental
to societal welfare, especially where such arrangements lack economic
substance.”); see, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary
Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 604-05 (2010) (discussing “inefficient tax
planning activities”); Raskolnikov, Cost of Norms, supra note 15, at 643 (“In
general, tax planning is inefficient because tax-motivated changes in behavior
produce deadweight losses.”); Schenk, An Efficiency Approach, supra note 15, at
515 (calling avoidance costs “pure social waste”); Daniel Shaviro, The Case
Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65, 68 (2011) (describing
“inefficient tax planning incentives”); Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 12, at 181
(“Clearly, any activity to reduce the tax is a pure loss from the social point of
view, and therefore creates a deadweight loss.”).
20. Weisbach explains that tax planning is “almost always positively bad for
society—it is worse than worthless.” David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax
Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002) [hereinafter Weisbach, Ten Truths
About Tax Shelters]. Weisbach allows only a few, potential exceptions to this
statement. These include: situations in which Congress intended taxpayers to
get special tax treatment for a particular form of a transaction and tax lawyers
help clients meet the prescribed form, and situations in which Congress actually
intended to change behavior through incentives and penalties. Id. at 224-25.
The latter exception is discussed at infra note 31. For Weisbach’s discussion of
why these exceptions do not swallow the rule, see id. at 225 n.22. One need not
get bogged down with how much of the tax code is actually intentionally
designed to change behavior through incentives and penalties versus how much
of the tax code is designed simply to raise revenue in accordance with the base
prescribed in order to accept the point that, at least as to the latter set of
provisions, planning around them is socially wasteful.
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fees associated with the tax planning transaction).21 For
example, a corporation may wish to issue equity as a means
of raising capital. However, when a corporation issues
equity and then pays dividends on such equity, the
corporation obtains no tax deduction.22 On the other hand, if
the corporation raises capital through debt and then pays
interest on the debt, the corporation gets a tax deduction.23
Corporations therefore may issue debt instead of equity to
obtain the tax deduction.24 Corporations also may spend
substantial sums in attorney and other fees trying to create
hybrid securities, which are considered debt for tax
purposes but equity for accounting purposes.25 These
activities are costly to corporations in numerous ways.
Issuing debt instead of equity may result in the corporation
being overleveraged, and therefore more susceptible to
bankruptcy.26 Alternatively, a corporation may expend
resources it could otherwise put to productive use on
massaging a security so that it is treated as debt for tax
purposes. Either type of cost (the cost of an inferior capital
structure or the out of pocket costs paid to attorneys and the
like) are net costs to society because they are
nonproductive.27 They merely transfer funds from the
government to the corporation in a costly fashion, without
producing anything of value.28

21. See Wojciech Kopczuk, Tax Simplification and Tax Compliance: An
Economic Perspective, in BRIDGING THE TAX GAP 119, 120 (Max B. Sawicky ed.,
2005) (describing costs of tax avoidance through tax planning, including
potential risk bearing costs, payments for advisors, the cost of misallocating
resources, etc.).
22. Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree:
Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C.
L. REV. 1217, 1229-30 (2008).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1228-32 (describing tax advantage of debt).
25. See id. at 1233-34 (describing hybrid securities).
26. Id. at 1233 (describing overleveraging problem and citing tax bias in favor
of debt as one of the main tax causes of the 2008 financial crisis).
27. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, supra note 20, at 222.
28. As Weisbach described, “Nothing is gained by finding new ways to turn
ordinary income into capital gain, to push a gain offshore, or to generate losses.
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The socially wasteful nature of tax planning is
particularly problematic because Congress often simply
intends to define the tax law, without affirmatively trying to
encourage taxpayers to respond to it. But the very
promulgation of the law provides taxpayers with both the
incentive and means to engage in tax planning.29 By way of
illustration, when Congress created the distinction for the
tax treatment of debt and equity, it is hard to imagine that
Congress did so to encourage corporations to issue more
debt. Rather, the more reasonable view is that Congress
was simply trying to define what created tax liability and
what created tax deductions, and interest payments
happened to produce tax deductions under this scheme. 30
Every time Congress defines what creates tax liability in
terms of particular taxpayer activity (such as paying
dividends on equity versus paying interest on debt),
taxpayers can then change their activity to reduce their tax
liability. These changes often are not the point of the rules,
but rather unfortunate revenue and efficiency-reducing
byproducts of them.
At bottom, then, at least outside of contexts in which
Congress affirmatively wants taxpayers to change their
activity in response to a tax provision,31 tax planning can be
No new medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed
through tax planning.” Id.
29. See id. at 225 n.22 (“Much tax planning is associated with taking
advantage of the imperfect rules for income measurement. Rules that measure
income imperfectly are not intentional subsidies (even if they are enacted
knowing they are imperfect), and planning around them produces social
losses.”). But see Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX
L. REV. 325, 386-87 (2002) (interpreting congressional tax incentives much more
broadly). This Article does not intend to rehash the debate between Weisbach
and Schler. Instead, this Article rests on the assumption that there are times
when Congress creates the tax law without intending taxpayers to change their
behavior in response, and yet the creation of the tax law nonetheless causes
taxpayers to change their behavior in order to reduce their tax liability.
30. Many would argue that the particular distinction between debt and
equity not only is not designed in order to change taxpayer behavior, but also is
nonsensical. Many less objectionable distinctions created by the tax law also
create efficiency costs by changing taxpayer behavior.
31. In some contexts, which can be referred to as “Pigouvian contexts,” the
above deadweight loss analysis does not apply. The basic concept behind
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seen as socially wasteful and, therefore, objectionable.32 As a
result, the architects of tax law face a fundamental
Pigouvian taxes and incentives is straightforward. Pigouvian taxes attempt to
force taxpayers to internalize externalities. Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the
Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685,
687-88 (2002); Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal
Tax Liability, 63 TAX L. REV. 797, 829 (2010). For example, when certain activity
imposes negative externalities, Congress may impose taxes on such activity to
discourage it. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-To-The-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 NYU L. REV. 1210, 1214 n.7 (1992) (describing how taxes on
polluting can be Pigouvian). On the flip side, Congress may create special
incentives for taxpayers to engage in more of certain activity that would produce
positive externalities. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk & Andrew L. Grossman, The
Failure of Tax Incentives for Education, 61 TAX L. REV. 295, 308 (2008) (citing to
education tax incentives as Pigouvian). In some cases Congress seems to intend
to change behavior in a manner that cannot be explained by an externalities
analysis. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, supra, at 687-88 (describing Congress’s
expansion of tax-subsidized transportation benefits as promoting an activity
with significant negative social costs). However, this Article need not address
the social value of responses to incentive tax provisions designed to change
activity, which do not appropriately respond to an externality. It is enough to
say that taxpayers changing their activity in response to the tax law is often
socially wasteful and, therefore, objectionable. On the other hand, when
taxpayers respond to an incentive provision put in place by Congress, which was
designed to encourage such change, the change at least arguably is not
objectionable.
32. A potential counterargument exists. If taxpayers engaging in higher
levels of tax planning have higher disutility toward paying taxes, then tax
planning may serve as a welfare increasing form of price discrimination. See,
e.g., Benjamin Alarie, Price Discrimination in Income Taxation (Jan. 30, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1796284.
Tax planning as price discrimination is an intriguing idea. However, tax
planning ultimately makes sense as a form of price discrimination only if
taxpayers engaging in tax planning actually have a higher disutility of
taxpaying, a claim that may be difficult to prove. Cf. Weisbach, Ten Truths
About Tax Shelters, supra note 20, at 223 n.18. Moreover, even if tax planners
had a higher disutility of taxpaying, tax planning as a form of price
discrimination would still face some problematic hurdles. The welfare increase
from taxpayers essentially being able to elect out of taxation through tax
planning would have to be weighed against the disutility to other taxpayers of
knowing (to the extent that they are aware) that tax planners were able to shirk
their taxpaying obligations easily through tax planning. Additionally, the tax
system is often envisioned as not just a means of raising revenue, but also a
redistributional vehicle. Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and
Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 526 (2013). As a result, any welfare gains
from taxpayers engaging in tax planning would have to be weighed against the

2013]

WHO'S NAUGHTY AND WHO'S NICE?

1069

conundrum. How can they discourage taxpayers from tax
planning to reduce their tax liabilities when the very
promulgation of the tax law provides taxpayers both the
incentive and means to tax plan?
B. Existing Frictions Literature
Tax scholars see frictions as an important solution to
this conundrum. The current, most basic understanding of
frictions in tax scholarship is that they are nontax costs
that make tax planning more difficult or costly. Scholars
have identified not only how nontax costs may impede tax
planning, but also how tax rules often are crafted to rely
intentionally on nontax costs (such as risk) in order to deter
such planning.33
The concept of frictions arises originally from the work
of economists, who recognized a fundamental paradox
regarding the tax system. In particular, Joseph Stiglitz
identified how, theoretically, under the tax rules
themselves, taxpayers could reduce much, if not all, of their
tax liability to zero through various tax planning
strategies.34 In contrast to this theoretical possibility,
however, taxpayers clearly do owe and pay taxes.35 The
implication was that real world limitations (outside the tax
system itself) must limit taxpayers’ abilities to engage in
this tax planning.36 Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson
welfare losses attributable both to the costs of planning and to the lost
redistribution.
33. For just a very small sample of articles relying on or discussing frictions,
see, for example, Fleischer, supra note 13, at 232-33 (discussing frictions
literature in article setting forth theory of regulatory arbitrage); Leandra
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 699 (2007) (discussing when third parties can
serve as frictions that reduce tax avoidance); Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J.
Hellwig, Taxing the Promise to Pay, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1092, 1150 (2005)
(discussing how economic benefit doctrine serves as a friction on nonqualified
deferred compensation arbitrage).
34. Stiglitz, supra note 13, at 325-28.
35. In 2011, the IRS collected over $2.4 trillion in taxes. 2011 I.R.S. DATA
BOOK 3 (2013), http://irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf.
36. Stiglitz, supra note 13, at 335; see also Daniel Shaviro, Commentary,
Evaluating the Social Costs of Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 445, 445
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determined that, indeed, such limitations do exist. Scholes
and Wolfson dubbed these limitations “frictions” and
defined frictions as “transaction costs incurred in the
marketplace that make implementation of certain taxplanning strategies costly.”37
The importance of frictions to the tax system led tax law
scholars to begin extensively studying frictions.38 While
some tax scholars distinguish frictions from tax rule
restrictions designed to deter tax planning,39 other scholars
(2002) (“It has been a familiar point, at least since Joseph Stiglitz made it, that
without various tax planning frictions large swatches of the existing income tax
would collect zero or negative revenue.”).
37. MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES
A PLANNING APPROACH 7 (1992).

AND

BUSINESS STRATEGY:

38. David Schizer has led the way on detailed study of how frictions work in
practice. Schizer has examined a variety of tax provisions, explaining how and
when frictions prevent end runs around tax reforms designed to discourage tax
planning. See, e.g., Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint, supra note 3 (examining
the constructive sale and constructive ownership rules and exploring how the
latter works better than the former as a result of frictions); David M. Schizer,
Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1886 (2004) (in which Schizer relies on frictions work in proposal
for “balance” in taxation of derivatives); William M. Gentry & David M. Schizer,
Frictions and Tax-Motivated Hedging: An Empirical Exploration of PubliclyTraded Exchangeable Securities, 13 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 9, 10-11 (2003)
(empirical study of frictions burdening public exchangeable securities); Schizer,
Sticks and Snakes, supra note 15, at 1365-67 (discussing frictions limiting
timing option for securities dealers).
39. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 13, at 252-64 (distinguishing between legal
constraints and transaction costs (or frictions) as two distinct means of
discouraging regulatory arbitrage (but acknowledging that at least one type of
legal constraint, shotgun antiabuse rules, often relies upon frictions)); Schenk,
An Efficiency Approach, supra note 15, at 508-14 (distinguishing between taxrule restrictions designed to deter tax planning, direct substitution costs of
various tax planning strategies, and frictions on tax planning (which Schenk
defines as “restraints on tax planning external to the tax law”)). Schizer also
relies on this distinction at times in his examination of frictions. The thrust of
Schizer’s work is that whether or not tax rules work to block tax planning
depends on how effectively they are backstopped by frictions. As a result,
Schizer is both formally distinguishing between tax rules and frictions and
recognizing that tax rules may be frictional (by depending on frictions). See, e.g.,
Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint, supra note 3, at 1395-96. These
categorizations track the distinction that Scholes, Wolfson, and others drew
between frictions (“transaction costs incurred in the marketplace that make
implementation of certain tax-planning strategies costly”) and tax-rule
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have recognized how tax rules themselves may rely on
frictions to impede tax planning. These rules themselves
can be considered “frictional.”40 For example, Dan Shaviro
has characterized the economic substance doctrine (and
statutory and regulatory rules that similarly rely on an
economic substance approach) as a frictional impediment on
tax planning,41 a characterization that has received
substantial adherents.42 Scholars have similarly identified
other tax rules that intentionally rely on nontax costs to
make tax planning more costly and characterized them as
frictions on tax planning.43 As a result, the scholarly
discussion and understanding of frictions applies to a broad
restrictions (“restraints imposed by the taxing authority that prevent taxpayers
from using certain tax arbitrage techniques to reduce taxes in socially
undesirable ways”). SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 37, at 9.
40. For ease of exposition, frictional tax rules will also simply be referred to
as “frictions.”
41. Shaviro, Economic Substance, supra note 1.
42. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 389, 441 (2010) (stating that “[a] risk analysis does impose a friction that
provides a disincentive to engage in tax arbitrage” but also voicing objections to
this approach); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax
Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 373-74 n.68 (2005) (adopting frictional view of
economic substance doctrine); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under
Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1187-88 (2008) [hereinafter
Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning] (adopting frictional approach but also
questioning how well risk serves as a deterrent).
43. See, e.g., Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 42, at 1192-97
(identifying, generally, tax rules that require taxpayers to bear risk to obtain
the desired tax treatment as frictions and including within this discussion rules
such as the wash sale rule and other waiting period rules, the constructive sale
rule, the constructive ownership rule, straddle rules, conversion transaction
provisions, certain nonrecognition rules, the at risk limitations, tax-free
contribution to corporation requirements, liquidation-reincorporation rules, and
various judicial common law doctrines). David Schizer also describes the wash
sale rule as frictional, in that the rule “burdens loss harvesting with a nontax
cost (or so-called ‘friction’): taxpayers have to give up economic exposure to the
depreciated asset (or double their exposure) for a specified period.” David M.
Schizer, Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules, supra note 8, at 69-70. Technically,
Schizer implicitly is distinguishing between the tax rule (the wash sale rule)
and the friction that it relies upon (changed economic exposure). See id.
However, for all intents and purposes, Schizer is characterizing the wash sale
rule as a frictional tax rule, in that the entire purpose of the wash sale rule is to
leverage the nontax cost of changed economic exposure to deter loss harvesting.
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swath of anti-tax planning rules that exist throughout the
tax code.44
In analyzing frictions, scholars predominantly focus on
how frictions can better deter tax planning from occurring,
an approach that primarily views frictions as “deterrence
vehicles.”45 In focusing on the deterrence aspect of frictions,
scholars have concluded that frictions should: (1) deter tax
44. However, not all tax rules should be understood properly as frictional, as
that term is used in this Article. Theoretically, any tax rule has a frictional
element. Any time a tax rule is promulgated, it excludes certain taxpayers from
the ambit of the rule. Nontax costs then presumably serve as a (not necessarily
successful) deterrent on taxpayers who do not already fit within the ambit of the
rule from engaging in tax planning to fit within the rule. For example, tax
liability depends on a couple’s marital status. For some couples (those subject to
the so-called “marriage penalty”), tax liability would be lower if they were not
married than if they were married. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100
CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2012). The cost of being unmarried solely for tax purposes
inevitably serves as a friction, deterring couples who would otherwise be
married from being unmarried solely to fit within the unmarried couples
category for tax purposes. However, the friction in this case is an inevitable
byproduct of the definitional tax rule, not an independent requirement relied
upon in order to make tax planning more costly. Another way of understanding
the distinction is that the rules regarding taxation of unmarried individuals are
not designed to deter individuals from becoming unmarried for tax reasons. They
simply define tax liability for whoever happens to be unmarried. Frictions, as
they are contemplated in this Article, have at least some deterrence element to
them. In other words, tax rules that are characterized as frictional (such as
economic substance) arise as independent requirements to deter tax planning.
This is distinguishable from the promulgation of tax rules which, simply because
of their definitional feature, naturally impose costs on some taxpayers getting
the most desirable tax treatment.
45. See, e.g., Shaviro, Economic Substance, supra note 1, at 223 (explaining
that the desirability of the economic substance approach depends on (1) the
desirability of deterring the tax planning at issue, and (2) how well the economic
substance approach succeeds at “generating such deterrence rather than simply
inducing taxpayers to jump through a few extra hoops before getting the desired
tax consequences anyway”). Schizer’s seminal work, Frictions as a Constraint on
Tax Planning, was a detailed study of exactly when frictions stop planning
rather than causing it to continue in a more wasteful fashion. See generally
Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint, supra note 3. Limited exceptions apply. Dan
Shaviro and David Weisbach briefly described antiabuse doctrines, including
the economic substance doctrine, as “merely rough sorting devices . . . to
separate transactions designed purely at wholesale tax elimination from real
business transactions.” Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth
Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 94 TAX NOTES 511, 513
(2002).
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planning rather than cause it to continue in a more wasteful
fashion, and (2) not impose costs on regular business
transactions. Dan Shaviro has most colorfully elaborated on
the first criterion with his description of the “backsomersault” friction.46 In discussing the economic substance
doctrine, Shaviro explained that “one might as well
condition favorable tax consequences on whether the
taxpayer’s chief financial officer can execute 20 backsomersaults in the IRS National Office at midnight on April
Fool’s Day, if such a requirement turns out to achieve a
better ratio of successful deterrence to inducing wasteful
effort in meeting requirements that are pointless in
themselves.”47 This basic understanding has been influential
in evaluating frictions.48 Scholars and policymakers alike
also emphasize the second criterion: costs that frictions
impose on regular business dealings, or non-planners, are
undesirable flaws of the rules.49 For example, David
46. Shaviro, Economic Substance, supra note 1, at 223.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1254 (2008)
(“Frictions can create value where they operate to bolster narrow tax provisions
in curtailing wasteful tax avoidance behavior. But frictions can also create social
costs. With respect to some taxpayers, for example, frictions may simply raise
the cost of socially wasteful behavior rather than deterring it.”); see also Schizer,
Frictions as a Constraint, supra note 3, at 1320 (focusing on total planning
waste from planners in response to frictions and noting that “[t]he added waste
from their continuing efforts sometimes will outweigh the savings from those
who stop”); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance
Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 103 (2002) [hereinafter Weisbach, An
Economic Analysis] (emphasizing the tradeoff by explaining that “[a]n increase
in the strength of anti-avoidance doctrines will reduce sheltering (the change in
elasticity) but also make those shelters that remain worse (the distortionary
effect)”).
49. This view is widespread across both policy and academic circles. For
representative scholarly discussions, see, for example, Raskolnikov, Relational
Tax Planning, supra note 42, at 1247 (discussing undesirable “distortions in the
behavior of innocent taxpayers”) and Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint, supra
note 3, at 1320 (discussing how frictions may be costly because they “undermine
‘good’ transactions that are not tax motivated”). In policy circles, frictions often
are subject to withering criticism to the extent that they are perceived to impose
costs on ordinary business transactions. For a particularly fervent attack along
these lines, see, for example, Sheldon I. Banoff, Katten Muchin & Zavis,
Comments on Proposed Reg. Section 1.701-2, (May 19, 1994), reprinted in
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Weisbach has called the application of frictions to taxpayers
not motivated by tax planning an “error” and suggested that
frictions should be made weaker in anticipation of these
types of errors.50
II. SCREENING MECHANISMS
Recognizing how frictions function first as screening
mechanisms, screening taxpayers based on underlying
characteristics, and then secondarily as deterrence vehicles
provides a whole new line of understanding and analysis.
This Part begins this process by exploring how screening
mechanisms work in the related optimal tax context, in
which the role of screening mechanisms is currently much
better understood.
Optimal tax theory is the renowned and highly
influential public finance theory that serves as a central
model for progressive taxation.51 Optimal tax theory
assumes that individuals vary according to some underlying
characteristic, which dictates their relative well-beings.52
Typically, this underlying characteristic is assumed to be
ability.53 Optimal tax theory then attempts to reach a
central redistributive goal: as a result of the presumed
declining marginal utility of consumption,54 the tax and
transfer system should redistribute from high ability

Partnership Antiabuse Regs Should Be Rescinded, Banoff Asserts, 94 TAX NOTES
TODAY, June 2, 1994, LEXIS, 1994 TNT 106-24.
50. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis, supra note 48, at 108 (describing
application of frictions to transactions without tax motivation as an “error”).
51. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of
Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution, AM. ECON. J., Feb.
2010, at 155, 155 (describing optimal taxation as “a centerpiece of modern public
finance . . . for which William Vickrey (1945) and J. A. Mirrlees (1986) won the
Nobel Prize”).
52. Jeff Strnad, The Progressivity Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal Attributes
1 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 293, 2004).
53. See, e.g., id.
54. Declining marginal utility of consumption means that, as the total
amount of consumption increases, an additional unit of consumption results in a
smaller increase in utility. Id. at 7.
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individuals to low ability individuals.55 However, this is
easier said than done. Much optimal tax scholarship
assumes that taxpayers’ underlying abilities are not directly
observable.56 As a result, ability must be indirectly observed
as a function of taxpayers’ income. 57 High-income taxpayers
are assumed to be high ability, and therefore should be
taxed at a higher rate.58 Nonetheless, if high ability
taxpayers are taxed at a higher rate when they earn high
income, they can masquerade as low ability taxpayers by
earning less income, which they can do by substituting
leisure for work.59 As Part I made clear, this shift in
behavior to avoid taxes would be an undesirable efficiency
cost. The fundamental dilemma of optimal tax theory, then,
is how to meet its redistributive goal while minimizing the
efficiency costs (principally assumed to be lower work effort)
that flow from using indirect measures (principally income)
as a means of screening high ability from low ability
taxpayers.60
While traditional optimal tax theory focuses on setting
the tax and transfer rates optimally, so as to allow the
desired amount of redistribution subject to the efficiency
constraints,61 economists have also developed a variety of
55. See Kyle Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of
Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 843, 847 (2008).
56. See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, Optimum Taxation with Errors in
Administration, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 181-82 (1982) (citing James Mirrlees, An
Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD.
175 (1971)); Strnad, supra note 52.
57. Stern, supra note 56, at 181-82.
58. David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 1 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 47, 74 (2009) [hereinafter Weisbach, Toward a New Approach].
59. Id.
60. Id. (explaining, with regard to optimal tax theory, that “it is now
standard in the economics literature to view taxation as an information or
screening problem”).
61. Legal tax scholars who have examined optimal tax theory have tended to
focus on this solution to the optimal tax screening problem. The seminal work
that introduced optimal tax theory to the legal literature was Joseph Bankman
& Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987). Bankman and Griffith
focused on the traditional task of setting the optimal tax rate/transfer in
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other mechanisms to respond to the optimal tax screening
problem. These other mechanisms rely on various inherent
characteristics of taxpayers to better target redistributive
tax or transfer policies toward low ability (or, under some
formulations, needy) individuals.62 As a result, these
mechanisms can be thought of more formally as “screening
mechanisms,” designed to separate different taxpayers (in
the optimal tax context, based on relative ability, wellbeing, or need).63
response to the optimal tax screening problem. Id. A number of examples exist
of legal tax scholarship taking into account other solutions to the optimal tax
screening problem. For example, David Weisbach examined “tagging”
disabilities. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach, supra note 58. Lily Batchelder
has discussed how inheritances may serve as tags for utility and ability. Lily L.
Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a
Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2009). Moreover, the
(largely theoretical) endowment tax literature imagines taxing taxpayers based
on inherent ability. As a result, in discussing the endowment tax, some legal
scholars have discussed the tagging literature. See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom &
Kendra Stead, Values and (Market) Valuations: A Critique of the Endowment
Tax Consensus, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1511, 1538 (2010). In another context (an
article addressing the consumption/income tax debate), Joseph Bankman and
David Weisbach raised, but did not endorse, the notion of taxing savings as an
indicator good. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an
Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 145355 (2006). Chris Sanchirico has offered a different view of taxation and indicator
goods. Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Ecelcticism, 64 TAX L. REV. 149, 210-16
(2011). Benjamin Alarie recently has discussed tagging in his account of tax
planning as price discrimination. Alarie, supra note 32, at 20.
62. See, e.g., Ritva Immonen et al., Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of
Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes, 65
ECONOMICA 179, 179 (1998) (discussing economists’ exploration of categorical
information); Wojciech Kopczuk, Redistribution When Avoidance Behavior is
Heterogeneous, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 51, 66 (2001) (“[I]f possible, the tax function
should also depend on variables other than taxable income.”); Mankiw &
Weinzierl, supra note 51, at 156; Alan D. Viard, Optimal Categorical Transfer
Payments: The Welfare Economics of Limited Lump-Sum Redistribution, 3 J.
PUB. ECON. THEORY 483, 483-84 (2001).
63. A separate, large literature has developed addressing transfers to the
poor and poverty relief. It is this literature which has done significant work
exploring some of the screening mechanisms discussed in the text, in particular
ordeals and, to a lesser extent, indicator goods. However, the issue of poverty
relief, although framed in terms of poverty and need, rather than the optimal
tax framing of redistribution and efficiency, is really the other side of the same
coin. Both poverty relief and the classic redistributive aim of optimal tax theory
attempt to redistribute to less able, or needier, individuals, creating the same
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The first such mechanism is tagging. George Akerlof
famously developed the notion that various characteristics,
such as age or disability, could be used to “tag” needy
individuals.64 As Akerlof explained, these tags should
identify groups of people who are, on average, needy.65
Individuals with these tags could then receive targeted
benefits, with relatively low efficiency cost, because nonneedy individuals would not be able to obtain the tag and
therefore could not masquerade as needy.66 Ideally, tags are
observable, immutable, and well correlated with the
relevant measure of neediness or well-being at issue.67 A tag
need not cause neediness in order to be useful. Rather, it
simply has to be a reliable, observable, and relatively nonimitatable indicator of neediness.68
However, often these three features will not all exist.
Akerlof, for example, originally contemplated female-headed
households as a tag for neediness, in accordance with Aid to

perverse efficiency incentives. Both can be seen as part of the same optimal tax
problem, and indeed, have been so seen by at least some scholars. See, e.g.,
Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, The Design of Income Maintenance
Programmes, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 187, 187-88 (1995) [hereinafter Besley &
Coate, The Design of Income Maintenance Programmes] (explaining how income
maintenance paper contributes to literature on screening and citing to
Mirrlees); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Income Transfers, 14 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN.
295, 322 (2007) (“The overall theme of this article is that questions involving the
design of transfer programs are best analyzed by reference to what is already
understood about optimal income taxation and what can be learned from
extensions of that framework.”). Indeed, Albert Nichols and Richard
Zeckhauser’s seminal work regarding indicator goods and ordeals was set within
the optimal tax framework. Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372,
372 (1982).
64. George A. Akerlof, The Economics of “Tagging” as Applied to the Optimal
Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 8, 8
(1978).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 8-17.
67. Logue & Slemrod, supra note 55, at 848.
68. Cf. Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 51, at 164-65 (“What matters for
optimal height taxation is the consistent statistical relationship between height
and income, not the reason for that relationship.”).
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Dependent Children policy.69 Having a female-headed
household, of course, is not an immutable characteristic and
using such a criterion to distribute aid may create perverse
(and inefficient) incentives for families.70 Other tags, like
disability, can be difficult to observe and may not always
correlate well with well-being.71 The upshot is that
underlying characteristics that correlate with ability or
need may screen individuals in a more efficient manner
than simply observing their incomes. Practically, though, it
may be difficult to find tags that meet the criteria well
enough,72 or that are politically palatable enough, to use.73
As a result of some of these difficulties, economists have
explored other screening mechanisms, the most relevant of
which is ordeals.74 Just like tags, ordeals rely on underlying
characteristics of groups of individuals to screen between
them. Ordeals are costs attached to a desirable benefit.75
Ordeals are designed to be relatively more costly to non69. Akerlof, supra note 64, at 9.
70. See id.
71. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach, supra note 58, at 52, 64.
72. Even when a characteristic does not meet the ideal characteristics of a
tag, it can still provide useful information that can be incorporated into the tax
system. See, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 61, at 22-23 (explaining that
inheritances do not fit perfectly as tags because they are mutable, but that they
nevertheless serve as important measures of endowment).
73. It turns out that height is actually a remarkably good indicator of earning
ability. Nonetheless, most would reject a tax system based on height. This
example highlights the political difficulties that may prevent the use of some of
the most promising tags. Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 51, at 155-56. Tags
are nonetheless frequently, albeit imperfectly, integrated into tax and transfer
systems. See, e.g., Viard, supra note 62, at 483 (“An important component of
most countries’ tax-transfer systems is the provision of transfer payments to
categories of individuals defined by (nearly) exogenous characteristics, such as
date of birth or disability.”).
74. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Shorter Paper, Workfare
Versus Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in PovertyAlleviation Programs, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 249, 249, 259 (1992) [hereinafter Besley
& Coate, Workfare Versus Welfare]; Tomer Blumkin et al., The Desirability of
Workfare as a Welfare Ordeal Revisited 3 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (“IZA”),
Discussion Paper No. 5130, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1663170.
75. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 63, at 372, 376.
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needy individuals, as a means of screening these individuals
out from obtaining the benefit.76 A good example of an
ordeal is a workfare requirement to receive welfare. At
various points in various countries, working in the public
sector or obtaining work training has been a requirement to
receive welfare benefits.77 One possible reason for these
requirements is that work and work training produce
human capital.78 However, another explanation is that
participating in workfare requirements is costly in terms of
opportunity cost. This opportunity cost is likely to be
greater for individuals who are less needy and have better,
alternative opportunities. As a result, a workfare
requirement may serve as an ordeal, imposing greater costs
on relatively non-needy individuals, discouraging them from
obtaining welfare benefits meant to be targeted to the truly
needy.79 The key to ordeals is that they impose greater costs
on the group that ideally would be excluded from receiving a
benefit.80
It merits emphasizing that good screening mechanisms,
whatever the type, share a number of important features.
Good screening mechanisms separate between a group of
individuals who should be screened in for a certain benefit
76. Id. at 376-77.
77. Katherine Cuff, Optimality of Workfare with Heterogeneous Preferences,
33 CAN. J. ECON. 149, 150 (2000).
78. Robert Moffitt, Welfare Work Requirements
Government Preferences, 116 ECON. J. F441, F444 (2006).

with

Paternalistic

79. Much debate has ensued about whether workfare makes sense as a
screening mechanism. Much of the argument turns on whether we should take
into account the disutility of the needy as a result of working in maximizing
social welfare. Compare, e.g., Besley & Coate, Workfare Versus Welfare, supra
note 74, at 260 (examining argument for workfare when objective is poverty
alleviation, not welfare maximization), and Besley & Coate, The Design of
Income Maintenance Programmes, supra note 63, at 207 (concluding that
workfare must be justified in non-utilitarian terms), with Blumkin et al., supra
note 74, at 3-4, 15-17 (making a welfarist case for workfare requirements). This
debate does not impact the basic example that workfare requirements can serve
as a screening mechanism by acting as an ordeal on obtaining welfare.
80. Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 63, at 377. Ordeals theoretically can
also work if they impose the same cost on needy and non-needy individuals, but
the needy individuals get greater utility from the underlying transfer, making
the cost less of a deterrent to the needy. Id. at 376-77.
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(i.e., low ability individuals in the case of optimal tax
theory) and those who should be screened out (i.e., high
ability individuals in the case of optimal tax theory) by
systematically imposing higher costs (or conferring lower
benefits) on the latter than the former. They do so by
identifying and relying on characteristics that generally
separate the group that should be screened in from the
group that should be screened out.
Understanding the fundamentals of screening
mechanisms reveals important insights, which are both
crucial to the design of frictions and yet not readily
apparent absent this screening foundation. First, even good
screening mechanisms often will not separate two groups
perfectly. For example, height may correlate very well with
earning ability, and therefore serve as a good screening
mechanism.81 However, a given tall individual, of course,
may in fact not have a high earning ability. Despite the
individual’s height, the individual may have other
particular characteristics that render the individual
incapable of earning a high amount. The fact that a height
screening mechanism gets it wrong in a particular case does
not mean that height is a poor screening mechanism.
Height’s value as a screening mechanism depends on how
well it tracks high earning ability as a general matter, not
whether it gets every case right. In other words, what
matters for a screening mechanism (and therefore for a
friction) is determining what groups systematically bear the
costs of the screening mechanism, not whether an
individual bears a cost in a particular case.
Additionally, since all the screening mechanisms track
characteristics as a means of separating groups, the
distinction between the screening mechanisms will not
always be analytically clear. Take tags and ordeals as an
example of this phenomenon. Once a tag is chosen, unless it
is completely immutable (which often will not be the case),82
individuals can change their behavior in response to the
81. Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 51, at 155-56.
82. Logue & Slemrod, supra note 55, at 849 (“In addition, a tag need not be
totally immutable (even blindness can be self–induced), but it must be relatively
so—relative, again, to the other options, such as income.”).

2013]

WHO'S NAUGHTY AND WHO'S NICE?

1081

tag, at which point it can still function as a screening
mechanism, albeit more like an ordeal. For example, take
the tag of female-headed household contemplated by
Akerlof.83 As an initial matter, to the extent that having a
female-headed household correlates well with neediness, it
can be used as a tag for neediness. However, once having a
female-headed household becomes a criterion for
redistribution, individuals have the incentive to change
their behavior to mimic neediness. Nonetheless, the cost to
individuals of acquiring a female-headed household, solely
in response to the criterion for redistribution, is necessarily
borne by those taxpayers that would not otherwise have a
female-headed household. Thus, to the extent that preexisting likelihood of having a female-headed household
correlates with neediness, the criterion of female-headed
household can still function as a screening mechanism,
albeit in the form of a somewhat distortionary ordeal.
Generalizing the point, for screening mechanisms (and
therefore frictions), the key is not whether the screening
mechanism necessarily deters particular undesirable
behavior, but rather whether it imposes higher costs on the
undesirable behavior, thereby lowering its likelihood of
occurring.
III. THE SCREENING PROBLEM WITH TAX PLANNING
These screening mechanisms are relevant to tax
planning because tax planning presents a screening
problem, which is both strikingly similar and related to the
screening problem at the heart of optimal tax theory. In the
optimal tax context, some taxpayers earn low income
because they are low ability and others do so because they
are mimicking low ability taxpayers to reduce their taxes.
The tax system needs to distinguish between low ability and
high ability taxpayers. After doing so, the tax system needs
to deter high ability taxpayers from earning low income, in
order to preserve revenue, redistribution, and efficiency.
With tax planning, some taxpayers pay low taxes because
83. Akerlof, supra note 64, at 9.
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that is what they owe under the tax laws, without engaging
in tax planning to reduce their taxes, and others pay low
taxes because they engaged in tax planning to reduce their
tax liability. The tax system needs to distinguish between
taxpayers based on their level of tax planning motivation.
After doing so, the tax system needs to deter taxpayers from
engaging in tax planning to maintain revenue,
redistribution, and efficiency. In both cases, it is important
to note that the task is not merely deterrence, but rather,
principally, a screening problem, followed by deterrence of
those taxpayers that the tax system wishes to exclude from
low tax liability.
Indeed, the optimal tax screening problem and the tax
planning screening problem can even be seen as two sides of
the same coin. Reducing work effort (and savings) in
response to taxation (the traditional focus of optimal tax
theory) and tax planning are the principal means of
reducing tax liability.84 As a result, taxpayers that reduce
work and taxpayers that tax plan really present the same
problem for the government’s efforts to collect tax revenue
in order to fund redistribution and other needs, and they
also create analogous efficiency costs. Economists have
reached a rough consensus that the response of work effort
to taxation appears to be small, whereas alternative
responses to taxation, including, principally, tax planning,
appear to be large.85 Thus, the tax planning screening
problem seems to pose a greater threat to revenue and
redistribution than the optimal tax screening problem that
scholars have extensively focused on.
The concept of tax planning as a screening problem is
based on an important, foundational point: taxpayers may
be engaging in very similar activity with varying degrees of
tax planning motivation. As a general matter, evidence
suggests that taxpayers exhibit varying degrees of tax
84. See Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the
Income Tax, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 674, 674 (1999) (incorporating what he calls
“tax avoidance” into deadweight loss from the income tax and showing how
including more than just labor and saving response is crucial in understanding
deadweight loss).
85. Kopczuk, supra note 62, at 51-53.
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planning motivation. Despite the conventional assumption
made in the economics literature that taxpayers will tax
plan until the cost of doing so equals the tax savings from
planning,86 taxpayers often fail to take straightforward
steps to reduce their tax liability. For example, a very high
percentage of taxpayers receives tax refunds from the U.S.
government.87 Since receiving a refund means that the
taxpayer has given the government an interest free loan, a
taxpayer’s receipt of a refund indicates the taxpayer’s
failure to minimize the cost of taxation. Recent research has
attributed this phenomenon, at least in part, to the
powerful impact of inertia, rather than solely to rational
behavior such as a response to uncertainty regarding tax
liability.88 Similarly, taxpayers often do not engage in the
strategic trading of stock holdings that they would if they
were engaging in optimal tax planning to reduce their tax
liability.89 When facing a decision about whether to sell
stock with a built-in loss or built-in gain, taxpayers
engaging in optimal tax planning generally should sell the
built-in loss stock to recognize the tax loss but defer the tax
gain.90 And yet, evidence suggests that many taxpayers do
the exact opposite, perhaps owing to behavioral
explanations such as loss aversion.91 At the same time, other
86. See, e.g., Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 12, at 186 (“A rational taxpayer
will be ready to sacrifice up to, but no more than, one dollar in order to save a
dollar of taxes.”).
87. Over three-quarters of taxpayers receive refunds. Damon Jones, Inertia
and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax Refunds, 4 AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 158, 158 (2012); see also Jannett Highfill et al., Tax
Overwithholding as a Response to Uncertainty, 26 PUB. FIN. REV. 376, 376 (1998)
(similar statistic noted with earlier data set).
88. See generally Jones, supra note 87.
89. Deborah Schenk provides a good explanation of this phenomenon.
Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV.
355, 385-87 (2004) [hereinafter Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization
Rule].
90. Id. at 386; see also Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms
and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1882-84 (1990) (valuing the timing
option).
91. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Are Individual Investors Tax
Savvy? Evidence From Retail and Discount Brokerage Accounts, 88 J. PUB.
ECON. 419, 423-27 (2003) (finding evidence that households realize gains faster
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evidence exists of tax-motivated selling of losses at year
end92 and of taxpayers responding to changes in capital
gains rates,93 indicating more optimal tax planning. The list
of missed tax planning opportunities in some circumstances,
balanced by examples of strategic tax planning, could go on
and on. While it is possible to argue that taxpayers
sometimes have high psychic costs of tax planning, which
would technically be consistent with the conventional
economic assumption that taxpayers tax plan until the cost
of doing so equals the tax savings from planning, the more
reasonable conclusion seems to be that not all taxpayers
engage in the maximum amount of “rational” tax planning
at all times.94 Even the same taxpayers may exhibit
different dispositions toward tax planning in different
contexts.
Why would taxpayers engage in different levels of tax
planning? Any number of reasons is possible. However, we
can conceptualize an answer to this question by imagining
that taxpayers consist of a number of different types. Type
A taxpayers have the ability and desire to engage in tax
than losses and that they exhibit other suboptimal tax planning decisions, such
as misallocating assets between taxable and retirement accounts, but also
finding evidence of tax-loss selling in December); Hersh Shefrin & Meir
Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long:
Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 785-90 (1985) (finding empirical evidence of
tendency to sell built-in gain stock and hold built-in loss stock and attributing
tendency to a variety of behavioral causes).
92. James M. Poterba & Scott J. Weisbenner, Capital Gains Tax Rules, TaxLoss Trading, and Turn-of-the-Year Returns, 56 J. FIN. 353, 365-66 (2001).
93. See, e.g., Zhonglan Dai et al., Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices:
Capitalization or Lock-in?, 63 J. FIN. 709, 709-11 (2008) (examining both buyer
and seller reactions to capital gains rate change).
94. See Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64
TAX L. REV. 489, 491 n.12 (2011) [hereinafter Osofsky, The Case Against]
(suggesting that while it is often possible to interpret actual, behavioral
responses in a rational actor model, doing so may strain credulity). Readers
familiar with the tax compliance literature are familiar with the notion that
taxpayers do not always act in accordance with some “rational” taxpaying
model. As a result, taxpayers appear to comply with their tax liabilities to a
greater degree than “rational” taxpayer models predict. See, e.g., id. at 522-23.
This intuition has not been fleshed out to the same degree in the context of tax
planning and efficiency.
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planning. As a result, they engage in tax planning to reduce
tax liability. Type B taxpayers also have the desire to
engage in tax planning but lack the ability to do so. (For
example, they just don’t hold the assets that lend
themselves to tax planning in a particular case). As a result,
they do not engage in tax planning. Type C taxpayers have
the opportunity to engage in tax planning, but they face
higher costs in doing so, in terms of acquiring the relevant
information, etc. (For example, they hold the assets that
lend themselves well to tax planning, but they don’t run in
tax-educated circles that inform them about how to tax
plan). As a result, they also do not engage in tax planning.
Finally, Type D taxpayers have the ability to tax plan
(including the opportunity, information, and decision
making ability to do so), yet they simply dislike tax
planning, and therefore do not engage in it. In any event,
given how tax planning reduces revenue, distorts
redistribution, and creates inefficiency,95 frictions should
help the tax system target relatively higher costs toward
the Type A taxpayers (the tax planners) and away from the
other types of taxpayers (the non-planners), just as optimal
tax screening mechanisms help direct higher costs toward
high ability taxpayers.96
The screening problem with tax planning is difficult
because even when taxpayers are engaging in very similar
activity, some may be doing so for tax planning reasons,
95. An implicit assumption is that the tax law itself is desirable, or set
optimally, such that planning around the tax law does not improve social
welfare. For a similar assumption, see Weisbach, An Economic Analysis, supra
note 48, at 90 (assuming that “the government is optimally implementing the
tax law,” which includes the assumption that “the government is subject to a
budget constraint and chooses tax laws that maximize the welfare of its
citizens”).
96. In contrasting Type A and Type D, some might say that Type A has a
higher disutility from taxpaying, and therefore we should be happy about Type
A tax planning and Type D not tax planning. However, this is not necessarily
the case. Type D may just face a higher disutility from tax planning, which is
completely independent of the level of disutility from taxpaying. In other words,
we can view the Type D taxpayer as simply facing higher costs to tax plan,
much as Type C has higher costs than Type A to tax plan. Type D might hate
taxpaying just as much as Type A, but Type D also happens to dislike tax
planning for whatever reason as well.

1086

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

some may not, and some may have a level of motivation that
falls somewhere in between. The easiest way to understand
this concept is through a specific example. As alluded to
above, sales of built-in loss stock confer a tax benefit. The
infamous realization rule in tax law dictates that a gain or
loss must be “realized” in order for the gain to be taxed or
for the loss to be deducted.97 While what constitutes
realization can be a very difficult question, some aspects of
realization are clear. In particular, mere appreciation or
depreciation of stock does not constitute realization; on the
other hand, outright sales of stock to a third party should
trigger realization.98
As a result, taxpayers have a tax incentive to sell builtin loss stock in order to take a tax loss, thereby potentially
offsetting gains and reducing tax liability.99 Indeed, a
taxpayer may wish to sell built-in loss stock merely to
trigger the tax loss, without truly divesting of ownership in
the stock. Absent any rules preventing the taxpayer from
doing so, such a taxpayer (a Type A taxpayer) might sell the
stock to trigger the tax loss and then repurchase the stock
(or similar stock), thereby obtaining the tax loss, without
really divesting economically.100
On the other hand, taxpayers may have nontax reasons
for selling built-in loss stock. They may anticipate future
depreciation in the stock’s value, or they may simply need
the proceeds. The list could go on and on. Taxpayers not
motivated by tax planning may similarly repurchase the
stock after the sale. For example, a Type B, C, or D
taxpayer may be forced to sell stock because she needs
capital and not as part of a tax plan. However, after the sale
97. I.R.C. § 1001 (2006); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920).
98. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 212-13.
99. A number of loss limitation rules apply including, principally, the
limitations on the use of capital losses. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2006). Moreover, the
realization rule does not apply in all contexts. For example, different rules apply
to securities dealers. See I.R.C. § 475 (2006).
100. Tax lawyers will recognize that this raises problems under the wash sale
rule, discussed below. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. The important point for
now is how taxpayers engaging in very similar activity may have different levels
of tax planning motivation.
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she receives an unexpected amount of cash and so
repurchases the stock. Alternatively, a Type B, C, or D
taxpayer may sell stock because she no longer wishes to
hold it. However, after the sale, the taxpayer reassesses and
determines that, in fact, the stock likely will appreciate in
value and repurchases the stock.101 While selling built-in
loss stock (perhaps followed by its repurchase) presents a
significant tax planning opportunity for Type A taxpayers,
taxpayers can engage in similar or identical activity with
very different levels of tax planning motivation.
IV. FRICTIONS AS SCREENING MECHANISMS
Although not focused on in the tax literature, frictions
serve not only as deterrence vehicles, but also as screening
mechanisms. This realization has conceptual importance for
the design of tax law, and also suggests concrete reforms of
particular tax provisions. This Part first sets forth the
conceptual importance of frictions as screening mechanisms
and then uses a number of case studies to illustrate how the
conceptual lessons can translate into concrete reforms.
A. Conceptual Importance of Frictions as Screening
Mechanisms
Frictions serve as screening mechanisms by imposing
differential (and higher) costs on Type A taxpayers (tax
planners) than Type B, C, or D taxpayers (non-planners).
This screening is akin to how optimal tax screening
mechanisms screen between different types of taxpayers by
imposing higher costs on high ability taxpayers than low
ability taxpayers. This key differential cost point
complicates conventional wisdom regarding frictions and
calls for a more complex framework for evaluating and
designing frictions throughout the tax code.
First, understanding the differential cost point
complicates the widely held belief that frictions are
successful if they deter tax planning rather than cause it to
101. See Osofsky, The Case Against, supra note 94, at 497 n.29 (raising the
example and flagging for future consideration).
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continue in a more wasteful fashion. The workfare for
welfare screening mechanism, which comes from the
optimal tax context, provides an instructive analogy. As
described previously, workfare can be used as a means of
targeting welfare more directly to needy individuals.
Ideally, the workfare requirement causes non-needy
individuals to abandon their attempts to obtain welfare,
thereby allowing needy individuals to obtain more of the
available welfare. However, even if workfare does an
exceptional job at deterring all non-needy individuals from
obtaining welfare, it would still fail as a screening
mechanism if it imposes similarly high costs on needy
individuals, causing them to abandon attempts to obtain
welfare as well. In the case of frictions and tax planning,
even if a friction does an exceptional job at deterring tax
planners (rather than causing planning to continue in a
more wasteful fashion), it may nonetheless be a failed
friction if it imposes similarly high costs on non-planners.
The gains from imposing costs on tax planners to deter
them from tax planning are (1) raising more revenue, which
can lower the relative tax burden of non-planners, and (2)
higher efficiency because of less tax planning. If a friction
subjects non-planners to high costs, then non-planners may
(1) face a high enough tax burden (including both actual tax
liability and any other costs they must bear from frictions)
so as to offset any revenue gains from reduced tax planning,
or (2) engage in inefficient behavior in response to the
friction, thereby lowering any efficiency gains. As a result,
the question is not just whether the friction imposes costs
on tax planners that deter tax planning, but rather whether
it imposes relatively higher costs on tax planners, thereby
deterring their tax planning to a greater extent than it
imposes countervailing burdens on non-planners.
Second, the differential cost point helps elucidate why,
notwithstanding conventional wisdom to the contrary, a
friction imposing costs on non-planners is not necessarily an
error, or a lamentable flaw to be fixed. Again, using the
workfare for welfare example, the workfare requirement
will impose costs on needy individuals, by subjecting them
as well to a workfare requirement. However, the fact that
the workfare requirement imposes costs on needy
individuals is not a flaw, as long as the workfare
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requirement systematically imposes greater costs on nonneedy individuals, thereby screening the non-needy out
from receiving welfare to a greater extent than would occur
absent the rule. Said another way, if the screen imposes a
cost on needy individuals, but allows them to garner a
greater share of welfare benefits, then the screen’s costs on
the needy may be unobjectionable. In the context of tax
planning, a friction that imposes costs on non-planners
nonetheless may place appropriately larger costs on tax
planners, discouraging the planning and producing more
tax revenue. This increased tax revenue may then allow
lower relative tax liability to be allocated to non-planners
than would occur absent the rule. This better allocation of
relative tax liabilities similarly may make the cost placed on
non-planners unobjectionable, rather than a flaw of the
friction.
The above discussion reveals that the analysis
regarding frictions is more complicated than that suggested
by the current literature. As discussed, asking whether
frictions deter tax planners to a greater extent than causing
them to continue in a more wasteful fashion does not
determine whether a friction is a good friction. Nor does
asking whether a friction imposes costs on non-planners
decide whether a friction is a bad friction. Indeed, even
putting the two questions together does not improve
matters significantly, because doing so does not elucidate
when a friction should impose costs on non-planners, or
when a friction that deters well should nonetheless be
abandoned. The comprehensive inquiry necessary to
analyze these questions is: does the friction impose
relatively greater costs on planners than non-planners,
thereby reducing overall social costs?
Understanding this central inquiry suggests a more
robust framework for evaluating frictions than the one
articulated by the existing scholarship. Again, applying the
screening mechanism analogy from optimal tax helps
establish general principles that are also applicable to
frictions and tax planning. With optimal tax, the point of
using a tag, such as height, as a screening mechanism for
earning ability is to better target lower tax liability toward
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low ability taxpayers and/or reduce the distortion
engendered by using income as a proxy for earning ability.102
Whether the screening mechanism (such as height)
ultimately makes sense, then, depends on how this
screening mechanism performs along a number of
dimensions. These include (1) the screening dimension: how
well height separates between high and low ability
taxpayers as an initial matter, and (2) the deterrence
dimension: whether height does a reasonably good job at
preventing high ability taxpayers from changing their
behavior in response to the tag itself.103 When the screening
mechanism functions by imposing a burden on taxpayers
(such as in the case of an ordeal, like a workfare
requirement), there is a third dimension to the analysis.
The screening mechanism’s value added from criteria (1)
and (2) must outweigh the costs the taxpayers ultimately
(and would not otherwise) bear as a result of the ordeal.
In the context of tax planning, frictions, as screening
mechanisms, must be evaluated across all these dimensions.
(1) As an initial matter, frictions must impose relatively
higher costs on tax planners than non-planners. (2) As to
the tax planners, the friction must do a better job at
deterring tax planning rather than causing it to continue in
a more wasteful fashion. (3) Finally, any costs that either
tax planners or non-planners actually end up bearing as a
result of the friction must be outweighed by the benefits of
the friction. These benefits include the increased efficiency
from deterring tax planning and the ability to allocate
relatively lower tax liabilities to non-planners. While much
work remains to be done in thinking about how to take into
account all of these different dimensions, and how to
balance them against each other, identifying how frictions
function as screening mechanisms and focusing on the
relatively underappreciated, screening dimension of the
analysis is nonetheless essential for tax law design.
Moreover, recognizing the different parts of the analysis
suggests ways to evaluate the tradeoffs between them. In
102. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 61-73.
103. See Logue & Slemrod, supra note 55, at 848-49.
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particular, the screening dimension may be in tension with
the deterrence dimension. Improving a friction as a
screening mechanism may weaken it as a deterrence vehicle
by offering tax planners more avenues to avoid the friction.
On the other hand, making it harder to evade a friction may
inadvertently create screening costs by imposing higher
costs on taxpayers not highly motivated by tax planning.
The potential tension between screening and deterrence
does not mean that screening should be ignored entirely.
Instead, we should begin to evaluate the tradeoff in a
systematic fashion. We might assign various welfare costs
to undesirable screening outcomes, with the welfare costs
depending on how nefarious we view the particular
screening outcomes to be. For example, because sex and
race discrimination violate equal protection norms, we
might view a friction that imposes greater screening costs
on the basis of a taxpayer’s sex or race as being more
nefarious than a friction that imposes greater screening
costs on the basis of a taxpayer’s relative level of risk
aversion.104 We could weigh these costs against net efficiency
and revenue gains that the friction produces as a result of
deterring wasteful tax planning.105 Implicit in this calculus
would be a determination of how important deterrence
versus screening was in a particular situation. When the
wasteful tax planning is either particularly wasteful or
poses a particularly great threat of reducing tax revenues
substantially,106 then the efficiency and/or revenue gains
from preventing such planning would be particularly large,
likely overriding many screening concerns. On the other
hand, when the tax planning is limited, or the screening
outcomes are particularly problematic, focusing on
screening would become more important. In the extreme, a
very undesirable screening outcome may require the
104. See, for example, infra note 153, indicating that race appears to be
correlated with flexible spending account usage.
105. These net gains should subtract out any more wasteful planning that
occurs as a result of the friction.
106. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Problem, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 925,
927 (2004) (describing tax shelter, which, if it had worked and had been
marketed to corporations, could have come close to wiping out the corporate
income tax base).
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elimination of the friction altogether, even if it serves a
strong deterrence role.107 We could also apply this calculus
to various, alternative formulations of the friction, in order
to craft the optimal friction in light of the
deterrence/screening tradeoff.
B. Concrete Reforms of Tax Law
Focusing on frictions’ screening role and integrating the
conceptual lessons discussed above can suggest concrete
reforms of the tax law. Sometimes existing frictions do a
reasonably good job of screening for tax planning, despite
the lack of scholarly attention to screening. Nevertheless,
focusing on screening can help make the frictions work
better. In other cases, frictions are screening in particularly
perverse ways, requiring significant reform. A number of
examples from the tax code help illustrate these points,
beginning with the wash sale rule.108
1. The Wash Sale Rule. The wash sale rule provides a
useful example of how frictions inherently serve as
screening mechanisms and how frictions can serve
reasonably well as screening mechanisms on tax planning
(rather than as screening mechanisms for some other
taxpayer attribute, such as ability). It also illustrates how
focusing on frictions as screening mechanisms can make
frictions even better suited to meet their screening role.
As illustrated previously, taxpayers may sell built-in
loss stock for a variety of reasons, with varying degrees of
tax motivation.109 The so-called wash sale rule, found in §
1091 of the Internal Revenue Code, impacts taxpayers’
abilities to sell built-in loss stock for tax reasons. The wash
sale rule generally disallows a tax loss deduction on the
disposition of depreciated stock or securities if the taxpayer
acquires “substantially identical” stock or securities within
thirty days prior or subsequent to the disposition that would
107. Indeed, the screening issues at the heart of the use-it-or-lose-it rule,
discussed below, suggest a strong need to reform the rule to remedy the
screening problems. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
108. I.R.C. § 1091 (2006).
109. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 99-101.
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otherwise trigger the deduction.110 So, if a taxpayer sells
stock111 at a loss but purchases substantially identical stock
(within the ambit of § 1091) within either thirty days prior
to or subsequent to the sale, then the taxpayer does not get
to deduct the loss for tax purposes.112
The wash sale rule, like all frictions, imposes nontax
costs on a desirable tax outcome. In the case of the wash
sale rule, taxpayers seeking to obtain a tax loss on the sale
of built-in loss stock, who nonetheless want to continue
holding the stock, have a number of avenues available to
them. A taxpayer can purchase the same stock (the
“replacement stock”) thirty-one or more days prior to the
sale of the original built-in loss stock and still obtain the
loss on the sale. In such a case, the taxpayer is purchasing
the replacement stock prior to the wash sale rule’s thirty
day waiting period. A taxpayer can purchase the same stock
(the “replacement stock”) thirty-one or more days after the
sale of the original built-in loss stock and obtain the loss on
sale. In such a case, the taxpayer is purchasing the
replacement stock after the wash sale rule’s thirty day
waiting period. Or, the taxpayer can obtain a substitute
position for the built-in loss stock (the “substitute position”)
within thirty days of the disposition, as long as the
substitute position is not “substantially identical” to the
built-in loss stock within the ambit of the wash sale rule.113
This set of options means that the principal cost that the
wash sale rule imposes on taxpayers is the cost of altering
their economic exposure to the original built-in loss stock, in
order to be able to take a tax deduction on the sale of the
stock at a loss. This altered economic exposure can take the
form of doubled up economic exposure to the built-in loss
stock for at least thirty days prior to the sale of the original
built-in loss stock, or no economic exposure to the built-in
loss stock for at least thirty days after the sale of the
110. I.R.C. § 1091(a) (2006).
111. At times in this discussion, I will refer to “stock” rather than “stock or
securities” simply in order to make the exposition more straightforward.
112. § 1091(a). The taxpayer adjusts the basis of the stock purchased to reflect
the disallowed loss deduction. § 1091(d).
113. § 1091(a).
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original built-in loss stock, or slightly different economic
exposure in the case of a purchase of a substitute position
during the waiting period.
Like with all frictions, the wash sale rule functions as a
screening mechanism. Specifically, any time a friction (or
cost to obtain a particular tax outcome) is put in place, the
cost will not affect all taxpayers equally. Rather, the cost
will affect taxpayers differently, thereby screening between
them based on some underlying characteristic(s). The wash
sale rule principally screens among taxpayers with different
motivations for selling built-in loss stock. As alluded to
previously, taxpayers may sell built-in loss stock for a
variety of reasons. These reasons determine the social waste
from the sale. If a taxpayer sold built-in loss stock for purely
tax reasons, followed by a repurchase, the sale and
repurchase would be a prime example of tax planning,
because the sale and repurchase are pure behavioral
distortion, and they simply reduce the taxpayer’s tax
liability at the expense of tax revenue raised. Alternatively,
a taxpayer may have some nontax motivations for selling
stock (such as a need for cash, or some doubts about the
stock’s future performance), along with some tax
motivations (the desire to sell built-in loss stock to take a
beneficial tax deduction). In such a case, there is still social
waste from the sale of the stock, because it would not have
happened absent tax considerations. However, the sale is
not as socially wasteful as if the taxpayer only had tax
motivations for the sale. Finally, a taxpayer selling built-in
loss stock purely for nontax reasons does not produce any
social waste from the sale.
The wash sale rule screens between taxpayers
producing these varying degrees of social waste by
functioning as a tag, albeit a highly imperfect one.
Specifically, the wash sale rule uses sale and repurchase of
substantially identical stock within a short period of time as
likely correlated with, and therefore indicative of, tax
planning
motivation.
Taxpayers
exhibiting
such
characteristics are then subject to a higher tax burden.
However, the tag in this case is far from immutable.
Namely, in light of the wash sale rule, tax planners can
simply alter their economic exposure to the original built-in
loss stock in order to avoid the rule.
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Nonetheless, the wash sale rule functions secondarily,
and reasonably well, as an ordeal on tax planning, because
it systematically imposes relatively higher costs on tax
planners. In particular, the changed economic exposure
requirement of the wash sale rule is going to be more costly
for taxpayers who (1) want to obtain a deduction on sale of
the built-in loss stock and yet (2) prefer not to change their
economic exposure to the built-in loss stock. Importantly,
taxpayers are systematically more likely to exhibit these
characteristics (and therefore to find the wash sale rule
more costly) the higher the level of social waste (or tax
planning motivation) from a sale. The taxpayer who sells
built-in loss stock solely for tax reasons is engaged in the
most tax planning because the pure tax play from selling
stock and immediately repurchasing it is entirely socially
wasteful.114 This taxpayer wants to obtain a tax loss
deduction on sale of the built-in loss stock and also likely
has the strongest preference for not changing economic
exposure to the built-in loss stock. The only reason this
taxpayer wishes to sell the stock is to obtain the tax loss. As
a result, the taxpayer ideally would like to hold onto the
114. This discussion focuses on the tax planning option of a taxpayer selling
stock and then repurchasing it. As described in the text, other options exist (e.g.,
purchasing an additional share of stock prior to the sale or purchasing stock
within the waiting period that is not characterized as “substantially identical”).
These alternative planning vehicles can be seen most easily as workarounds to
the principal rule, which disallows a sale of stock followed by a repurchase
within thirty days of the same stock. If this principal rule were the only rule,
taxpayers could easily evade it by instead purchasing the same stock
immediately prior to the sale or immediately purchasing stock that is
substantially identical (with minor alterations) either before or after the sale. As
a result, the rules regarding purchase of stock prior to the sale and purchase of
substantially identical stock can be seen as backstop rules to the principal rule
regarding repurchase of stock after the sale. Of course, as frictions, these
backstop rules produce their own costs, which act as screening mechanisms.
While I do not explore these in the text, it is reasonable to assume that the
taxpayers more likely engaged in tax planning are those taxpayers that would
be more likely to purchase the same stock in very close proximity but prior to a
sale or to purchase substantially identical stock close in time to a sale. As a
result, these backstop rules also seem reasonably likely to impose higher costs
on taxpayers more likely engaged in tax planning. The analysis for these
backstop rules, then, is similar to the analysis for the principal rule in the text.
Additionally, future work would benefit from viewing these frictions as
screening mechanisms, allowing for a deeper probing of these assumptions.
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built-in loss stock. If the taxpayer did have a desire to
change economic exposure to the stock, the taxpayer could
have done so. The pureness of the tax planning motivation
is the very thing that makes the prospect of changed
economic exposure particularly costly.
Next, a taxpayer selling the stock for some tax reasons
and some nontax reasons produces some social waste, but
not as much social waste as if solely tax reasons caused the
sale. The fact that this taxpayer has some nontax
motivations for the sale likely makes the prospect of
changed economic exposure less costly than if solely tax
motivations had caused the sale. For example, the taxpayer
may have some doubts about the future performance of the
stock, though not enough to sell absent tax considerations.
These doubts, though, make changed economic exposure
less costly than if the taxpayer had solely tax reasons for
the sale.
Finally, the taxpayer who sells the stock without tax
motivation produces no social waste. For this taxpayer, the
prospect of changed economic exposure is likely least
costly.115 The taxpayer may have sold the stock precisely to
change economic exposure to it (for example, because of a
belief that the stock was going to depreciate further in
value). Or, the taxpayer may have sold the stock to meet
another need (such as a need for cash), and this need
outweighed the desire for continued economic exposure to
the stock. Either way, the prospect of changed economic
exposure should not be particularly costly, at least at the
time of the sale, for a taxpayer selling either in order to
change economic exposure or to meet some other,
superseding need.116

115. This is not to say that the changed economic exposure requirement does
not end up being costly to the taxpayer who sold without any tax motivation.
This issue is discussed in more detail in the text that follows.
116. See Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 42, at 1186-87
(concurring with this view and arguing that “‘real’ (not tax-motivated)
transactions will continue unaffected because taxpayers who want to get rid of
the loss security for good will care little about its possible appreciation during
the next thirty days”).
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The overall relationship between tax planning
motivation and likely costliness of the wash sale rule does
not mean that the wash sale rule perfectly imposes costs
relative to a taxpayer’s level of tax planning motivation. At
times, even taxpayers with very little tax planning
motivation may find the changed economic exposure
required by the wash sale rule to be costly. Sometimes, this
situation will occur predictably. Certain types of taxpayers
who engaged in sales without tax planning motivation will
reacquire within the waiting period, resulting in
disallowance of the tax loss deduction. For example, many
mutual fund investors are enrolled in automatic dividend
reinvestment programs, whereby their dividends are
reinvested in the same fund automatically.117 If a taxpayer
invested in such a program sells a portion of her holding at
a loss and does not stop the automatic dividend
reinvestment on the remaining portion, then a portion of
the loss may be disallowed.118 This is true even if the
taxpayer has purely nontax motivation for the sale. In less
predictable situations, taxpayers with little or no tax
motivation for the original sale may nonetheless end up
finding the changed economic exposure required by the
wash sale rule to be costly.119 For example, a taxpayer may
sell stock at a loss without any tax planning motivation,
believing the stock is going to go down in value further and
then, within the thirty day waiting period, change her mind
and believe the stock is now going to appreciate in value. 120
Even though this taxpayer had no tax planning motivation
for the sale, maintaining changed economic exposure during
the waiting period to preserve the tax loss from the sale
may prove costly.121
117. See CBIZ, The Wash Sale Rules, IN TOUCH, May 2011, at 4, available at
http://www.cbiz.com/pdfs/CBIZ_InTouch_May2011.pdf (explaining this issue).
118. See id.
119. See Osofsky, The Case Against, supra note 94, at 497 n.29.
120. See id.
121. See id. (discussing similar concerns); Schizer, Scrubbing the Wash Sale
Rules, supra note 8, at 70 (describing “a taxpayer who sells depreciated property
because she no longer wants it . . . [who] may then be deterred from reacquiring
it when circumstances change”).
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Understanding how screening mechanisms work reveals
that, despite these potential mismatches, the wash sale rule
works reasonably well as a screening mechanism on tax
planning. Just as height may serve reasonably well as a
screening mechanism for high earning ability, even if it gets
the relationship between height and earning ability wrong
in particular cases, so might the wash sale rule serve
reasonably well as a screening mechanism on tax planning,
even if it imposes the occasional cost on taxpayers with low
tax planning motivation. The relevant question is: are
taxpayers more likely engaged in tax planning
systematically more likely to find the wash sale rule to be
costly? While the answer to this question is ultimately
empirical and unknowable with certainty, making the
question clear nonetheless allows for a reasoned design of
the rule. It does seem likely that taxpayers who reacquire a
stock position in close proximity to a sale (thereby failing to
meaningfully change their economic exposure to the stock
that was sold) are more likely to be engaged in a tax play.
As a result, taxpayers engaged in tax planning to a greater
extent seem systematically more likely to find the wash sale
rule to be costly. Therefore, even if, on an ex post basis, the
rule does not always impose costs on the right taxpayers, its
design makes it a promising screen on tax planning.
Nevertheless, understanding how the wash sale rule is
functioning as a screening mechanism can help improve its
screening abilities. While, as discussed previously, imposing
costs on non-planners may be part of a well-designed
friction,122 evaluating a friction necessarily involves
examining how, if at all, the friction is systematically
imposing costs on characteristics other than tax planning.
The wash sale rule does systematically impose predictable
costs on taxpayers less motivated by tax planning, such as
taxpayers enrolled in automatic dividend reinvestment
programs through a mutual fund, or taxpayers who have
otherwise delegated active management of part of their
stock or security holdings to other parties, who may then
engage in sales or acquisitions that would trigger the wash

122. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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sale rule.123 Applying the screening mechanism terminology,
this mismatch can be understood most easily as a problem
at the tagging stage. Namely, the wash sale rule operates
based on the assumption that sales of built-in loss stock,
accompanied by repurchases in a short time frame, are
highly correlated with tax planning motivation. However,
certain predictable exceptions to this general correlation
exist. As a result, the friction’s screening can be improved
by becoming more fine-grained. Using optimal tax as an
analogy, take height being used a strong indicator of
earning ability. Imagine, however, that tall people who did
not attend kindergarten systematically do not tend to have
high earning ability. In such a case, “tall people who
attended kindergarten” would be a stronger screen for
earning ability than simply “tall people.” Applying this logic
in the context of tax planning, the wash sale rule may be a
sharper screening mechanism for tax planning if the rule
excluded certain passive sale and repurchase transactions,
such as through mutual fund automatic dividend
reinvestment programs. Of course, whether it ultimately
makes sense to shore up screening should depend on the
perceived costs of the screening errors, as balanced against
any deterrence costs from improving screening.124
Viewing the wash sale rule as a screening mechanism
on tax planning also can cause a more fundamental
rethinking of the rule. The wash sale rule was put in place
as part of the Revenue Act of 1921, along with some of the
most basic rules regarding taxation of capital gains and
losses.125 The legislative history suggests that the rule was
put in place in order “to prevent evasion through the
medium of wash sales,”126 which is consistent with the
friction’s dual role as a screening mechanism and
deterrence vehicle. Of course, the nature of stocks and
securities (and who holds them) has changed substantially
since 1921. Such changes should be considered in
123. See CBIZ, supra note 117, at 6-7.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 104-106.
125. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 214(a)(5), 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
126. S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 14 (1921).
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determining whether and how the wash sale rule should be
updated. For example, as the volatility of stock increases,
even taxpayers not selling stock for tax planning reasons
are more likely to repurchase the stock during a shorter
period of time. As stocks become more passively managed by
large pension funds and the like, the impact of the wash
sale rule on such passively managed funds becomes greater
and potentially more problematic, which supports the
argument in favor of more exceptions and carveouts.
2. The Use-It-or-Lose-It Rule. The importance of
recognizing how frictions serve fundamentally as screening
mechanisms also comes into sharp relief when examining
the use-it-or-lose-it rule127 in the context of flexible spending
accounts. The use-it-or-lose-it rule can be seen as an ordeal
that makes tax planning more costly. However, the use-itor-lose-it rule screens for more than just tax planning.
Among tax planners, it also systematically imposes higher
costs on taxpayers who are less sophisticated decision
makers, and taxpayers who are in lower marginal tax
brackets. While many screening mechanisms impose costs
on characteristics other than their primary target, the useit-or-lose-it rule does so in a way that is undesirable at best,
and highly perverse at worse. Recognizing how the use-it-orlose-it rule is screening suggests potential reforms to
improve the rule. The use-it-or-lose-it rule thus provides a
good example of how understanding a friction’s screening
role is essential, even if the friction performs well as a
deterrence vehicle.
Understanding the (arguable) need for a friction at all
in the context of flexible spending accounts requires
understanding a bit about their history.128 The congressional
127. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(c), 72 Fed. Reg. 43937, 43957 (Aug 6, 2007).
128. The following discussion attempts to provide the best possible
justification for the use-it-or-lose-it rule as a friction. Many would argue that
there is no reason to limit taxpayer use of flexible spending accounts as a means
of financing current health and dependent care needs in a tax advantaged
manner. See, for example, the criticism of the use-it-or-lose-it rule discussed in
Matthew Dalton, No Changes for FSA ‘Use-It-or-Lose-It’ Rule in 2012, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 15, 2012, LEXIS, 2012 TNT 199-8. Under this argument, the
use-it-or-lose-it rule serves no reasonable role, even as a deterrence vehicle.
However, as discussed in the text, there is at least some argument that, based
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authority for flexible spending accounts is in § 125 of the tax
code, which allows taxpayers to choose between receiving
taxable cash or non-taxable benefits, without being taxed on
receipt of the non-taxable benefits.129 Under § 125, the IRS
has taken the position that employers can provide their
employees with insurance for specified needs, including
health and dependent care needs, without the employees
being taxed on the receipt of that insurance.130 Taxpayers,
however, have ignored the IRS’s narrow, insurance
interpretation and have relied on this authority to engage in
broader tax planning through flexible spending accounts. 131
Specifically, taxpayers have seen flexible spending accounts
as a more general means of avoiding taxation on their
salary by diverting such salary into flexible spending
accounts to fund health and dependent care needs.132
While the general unpopularity of the use-it-or-lose-it
rule133 has obscured the IRS’s perspective, the interaction
between flexible spending accounts and other provisions of
the tax code helps bolster the case for some sort of friction
on flexible spending account usage. If taxpayers could
allocate as much salary income as they wanted to flexible
spending accounts, and then simply retrieve any unused
funds without any penalty or risk, taxpayers could use
flexible spending accounts to create a dollar-for-dollar
deduction for health or dependent care needs, in a manner
not otherwise allowed (in the case of dependent care needs)
on the history of flexible spending accounts and other tax code provisions,
taxpayers are using them to create unintended tax planning benefits, and,
therefore, the use-it-or-lose-it rule serves a reasonable deterrence goal. Whether
or not the use-it-or-lose-it rule serves a reasonable role as a deterrence vehicle,
it is highly problematic from a screening perspective.
129. I.R.C. § 125 (2006).
130. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(c), 72 Fed. Reg. 43937, 43957 (Aug 6,
2007).
131. For a good description of this history, see Adam Chodorow, Charitable
FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and Charitable Giving Tax Provisions,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1041, 1050 (2011).
132. See id. at 1049-53.
133. See Dalton, supra note 128 (describing “tsunami” of comments advocating
elimination of use-it-or-lose-it rule).
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or even explicitly disallowed (in the case of health care
needs) by other provisions of the tax code. In particular,
take § 213 of the code, which limits taxpayers’ abilities to
deduct medical expenses.134 Section 213 places a significant
floor on deductibility of medical expenses.135 A taxpayer’s
medical expenses are only deductible to the extent they
exceed 10% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.136
However, if taxpayers faced no penalty for retrieval of
unused funds from flexible spending accounts, taxpayers
could just allocate large amounts of salary to flexible
spending accounts to cover any medical expenses that might
arise and then retrieve any unused funds. The net result
would be that these taxpayers would obtain a deduction
from income tax (via the funds invested in the flexible
spending account and actually used to pay for medical
expenses) for the same expenses for which § 213 disallows a
deduction, albeit through a wasteful tax planning
technique.137
The use-it-or-lose-it rule serves as a friction on broader
tax planning by taxpayers. Under a so-called use-it-or-loseit rule, taxpayers must use the money they put aside in a
flexible spending account in a given tax year, or else forfeit
it.138 Importantly, the use-it-or-lose-it feature of the flexible
134. I.R.C. § 213 (Supp. IV 2011).
135. See id.
136. I.R.C. § 213(a); see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
111-148, §§ 9013(a), (d), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 868 (2010).
137. Of course, one way to limit this gambit would be to place a cap on the
amount of funds that can be invested in a flexible spending account. Indeed, a
newly effective $2,500 cap limits allocations of salary to health flexible spending
accounts. I.R.C § 125(i) (Supp. IV 2011). This cap serves as a limit on tax
planning, but not a deterrent (or friction) below the cap. In particular, the cap
prevents taxpayers from using flexible spending accounts to make medical
expenses in excess of $2,500 deductible on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but it does
nothing to deter the tax planning below this $2,500 cap. Moreover, the cap
limits flexible spending account usage even as to those taxpayers viewing the
flexible spending accounts as insurance, rather than a way to make medical
expenses deductible on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Finally, the cap in this
particular case only applies to health flexible spending accounts. Id.
138. Recent changes to the rules allow a two and half month grace period to
use the funds. I.R.S. Notice 05-42, 2005-23 I.R.B. 1204. Even more recent
changes (which occurred as this Article was going to press) allow an employer,
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spending accounts is a friction. It is a friction, as scholars
understand frictions, because it imposes a nontax cost on
taxpayers’ abilities to turn taxable salary income into
nontaxable salary to finance current health and dependent
care needs.139 The use-it-or-lose-it rule dictates that
taxpayers cannot receive a refund of any amounts placed in
flexible spending accounts that are unused in a particular
tax year.140 As a result, the use-it-or-lose-it rule subjects
taxpayers to risk that the money they set aside in a flexible
spending account will have to be forfeited, because they end
up not having sufficient health or dependent care needs in a
given year to use all of the funds. Alternatively, the use-itor-lose-it rule subjects taxpayers to the risk of having to use
money in a flexible spending account to pay for care the
taxpayer does not particularly want, to avoid forfeiting the
funds. The risk of losing the funds (or of having to use them
suboptimally) is a nontax cost that reduces the likelihood
that taxpayers will engage in tax planning.
The use-it-or-lose-it rule appears to be quite effective in
deterring taxpayers from broadly tax planning through
flexible spending accounts. While it is difficult to isolate the
impact of the rule, it appears that the rule has limited
at its option, “to amend its § 125 cafeteria plan document to provide for the
carryover to the immediately following plan year of up to $500 of any amount
remaining unused as of the end of the plan year in a health FSA.” I.R.S. Notice
2013-71 (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-71.pdf.
Employers may choose between either the grace period or a carryover of up to
$500 of unused amounts, but not both. Id. The continued adherence to the useit-or-lose-it rule, accompanied by the modifications, reveals both the belief by
the Treasury Department and the IRS that some friction is necessary, and an
implicit acknowledgment of the costs imposed by a friction.
139. See, e.g., JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 62-63 (16th
ed. 2012) (raising a question about the reasons for the use-it-or-lose-it rule and
explaining how the rule may limit the use of flexible spending accounts); see also
SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 37, at 226 (describing how the use-it-or-lose-it
rule means that “[t]he optimal amount of funding [health care flexible spending
accounts] is some amount below your best guess of medical costs because
overfunding costs more than underfunding”).
140. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(c), (o), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43960 (Aug. 6,
2007) (describing use-it-or-lose-it rule and what the employer may do with
“experience gains or forfeitures,” and explaining that “in no case may the
experience gains be allocated among employees based (directly or indirectly) on
their individual claims experience”).
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taxpayers’ use of flexible spending accounts.141 For example,
data shows that approximately 37% of taxpayers eligible to
use health care flexible spending accounts do so.142 This low
rate is often attributed in part to the use-it-or-lose-it rule
and the accompanying risk of forfeiture.143
Despite its apparent success as a deterrence vehicle
(and entirely apart from whether deterring tax planning is
even an appropriate goal in this context), the use-it-or-loseit rule is particularly problematic because of how it
functions as a screening mechanism. Indeed, focusing on the
screening problems with the use-it-or-lose-it rule reveals
perversities with the rule otherwise lost in popular
discourse. As an initial matter, the use-it-or-lose-it rule can
be seen as an ordeal on tax planning. In particular, those
taxpayers who want to use flexible spending accounts
broadly in order to turn taxable salary into a non-taxed
means of funding their own health and dependent care
needs, while ignoring the IRS’s more limited view of these
accounts as insurance vehicles, are likely to find the
prospect of losing funds as a result of this planning to be
costly. On the other hand, taxpayers who intend to use the
141. See JANEMARIE MULVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32656, HEALTH CARE
FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS 5 (2012).
142. Id. Moreover, the average annual contribution by those who contributed
to health care flexible spending accounts was only $1,420. Id.
143. See, e.g., Chodorow, supra note 131, at 1077 n.164 (describing lack of
empirical evidence explaining low participation in and low funding of flexible
spending accounts, but citing aversion to the loss of potential funds invested and
the administrative burdens of tracking medical spending and submitting
receipts as likely reasons); Colin M. Ramsay & Victor I. Oguledo, Optimum
Allocations to Health Care Flexible Spending Accounts, 15 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J.
448, 450-51 (2011) (explaining that fear of forfeiture explains underinvestment
in flexible spending accounts and citing supporting survey data); Lawrence
Zelenak, Of Head Taxes, Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American
Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 117 (2006) (indicating that, while
“hard data are not readily available,” low flexible spending account usage is
generally attributed, in part, to the use-it-or-lose-it rule and in part to
administrative burdens of participating in and offering the accounts); Ashlea
Ebeling, ObamaCare Calls Flexible Spending Account Use-It-Or-Lose-It Rule
Into Question, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ashleaebeling/2012/06/19/obamacare-calls-flexible-spending-account-use-it-orlose-it-rule-into-question/ (claiming that “millions of folks don’t take advantage
of [flexible spending accounts] because of the dreaded ‘use-it-or-lose it’ rule”).
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flexible spending accounts more narrowly as a means of
getting insurance (in accordance with the IRS’s
interpretation of the rules) are less likely to find the
prospect of losing funds to be costly.
However, in addition to imposing relatively higher costs
on taxpayers more likely motivated by broader tax
planning, the rule also systematically imposes higher costs
on particular types of taxpayers in undesirable ways.
Significantly, the rule tends to impose the greatest costs on
taxpayers with the following characteristics: those who are
less sure of their health or dependent care needs in a given
year (who therefore are less capable of estimating the
likelihood of incurring various levels of expenses); those who
are less sophisticated decision makers (who therefore are
less capable of evaluating whether investment in a flexible
spending account makes sense in light of the risks imposed
by the use-it-or-lose-it rule); and those with lower marginal
tax rates (who therefore have less to gain from investing in
the flexible spending account and more to lose as a result of
the use-it-or-lose-it rule). The first characteristic may seem
like a somewhat arbitrary, but relatively innocuous, basis
upon which to screen taxpayers. However, the latter two
characteristics are more problematic.144
As an initial matter, by imposing greater costs on
taxpayers who are less sophisticated decision makers, the
use-it-or-lose-it rule problematically tends to impose
relatively higher costs on taxpayers who already suffer a
deficit that likely negatively impacts their well-being.
Determining how much (if any) salary income to divert to
144. As a general matter, by relying on a characteristic (such as willingness to
live in public housing, or willingness to bear a workfare requirement) as a
means of tracking an underlying trait (such as neediness), screening
mechanisms often benefit one group over another in unintended ways. For
example, using willingness to bear a workfare requirement as a screen for
neediness, based on a theory that needier individuals have lower opportunity
costs in meeting workfare requirements, imposes a relatively greater burden on
needy individuals who happen to have a higher disutility toward working. While
at times these discrepant burdens might not undermine the value of the
screening, at others they are problematic enough that they potentially
undermine the screening endeavor. The latter appears to be the case with the
use-it-or-lose-it rule. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107 for discussion
of assigning welfare costs to undesirable screening outcomes.
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flexible spending accounts, in light of the use-it-or-lose-it
rule, can require a relatively high-level decision process. For
example, one model regarding what investment in a health
care flexible spending account makes sense first requires
taxpayers to determine a minimum and maximum of
potential health expenses for the year, then create a
probability distribution of the likelihood of various levels of
expenses in this range, and then determine the incremental
expected value of investing funds in the flexible spending
account.145 According to the model, the taxpayers should
continue investing in the flexible spending account until the
incremental expected value of doing so is negative.146 No
shortage of other models, each with their own complexities,
exists.147 Of course, taxpayers can choose to invest in flexible
spending accounts without going through any of these
models, and they may choose to invest in, but underfund,
accounts to avoid risk of forfeiture without going through a
painstaking decision process. However, those who can apply
the models or similar reasoning are at an advantage. The
important point is that the use-it-or-lose-it rule imposes
relatively greater costs on taxpayers with lower capacity to
deal with tradeoffs and decisions under uncertainty. The
lower a taxpayer’s capacity for such decision making, the
more costly the use-it-or-lose-it rule becomes. Imposing
greater costs on taxpayers with lower decision making
capacity is fundamentally problematic because taxpayers
145. Franklin Lowenthal & Philip Storrer, Medical FSAs: An Expected Value
Analysis, 100 TAX NOTES 521, 523 (2003).
146. Id. at 523-24. At the conclusion of their model, Lowenthal and Storrer
describe it as “simple.” Id. at 524. This is clearly relative.
147. See, e.g., Rolf Auster & John T. Sennetti, Optimal Use of Flexible
Spending Arrangements: A Marginal Analysis Approach, NAT’L PUB. ACCT., Mar.
1994, at 15; Jayanta Bhattacharya et al., Optimal Contributions to Flexible
Spending Accounts, 76 ECON. LETTERS 129 (2002); James H. Cardon & Mark H.
Showalter, An Examination of Flexible Spending Accounts, 20 J. HEALTH ECON.
935 (2001); James H. Cardon & Mark H. Showalter, Flexible Spending Accounts
as Insurance, 70 J. RISK & INS. 43 (2003) [hereinafter Cardon & Showalter,
Flexible Spending Accounts as Insurance]; John T. Cuddington, Optimal Annual
Contributions to Flexible Spending Accounts: A Rule-of-Thumb, 62 ECON.
LETTERS 59 (1999); Thomas S. Nunnikhoven, Finding the Optimal Allocation to
a Health-Care Reimbursement Account, 11 INS.: MATHEMATICS & ECON. 223
(1992); Ramsay & Oguledo, supra note 143.
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with lower decision making capacities likely make poorer
decisions along a number of dimensions, reducing their
overall well-being.148 Systematically imposing relatively
greater costs on such taxpayers through the use-it-or-lose-it
rule is difficult to defend as a matter of tax policy.149
The use-it-or-lose-it rule also systematically imposes
greater costs on taxpayers with lower marginal tax rates,
which perversely makes the rule more costly to lower
income taxpayers. Scholars have recognized how being able
to exclude amounts from income (or, equivalently, being
able to deduct the same amounts from income) is more
beneficial to high income individuals, because of their

148. For a discussion of the tax policy implications of a clearly related, but
different concept, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371
(2011). Fennell examines the impact of willpower on well-being and
contemplates how the tax system should treat willpower. Id. For a study
supporting the notion that having lower decision making resources can affect
the quality of decisions, see Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and
Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision
Making. 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 278, 282-86 (1999) (finding that availability of
processing resources determines the extent to which individuals can engage in
higher-order decision making governed more by cognition and less by affect).
149. One possible defense is that people who are poor decision makers are less
likely to turn tax savings into reasonable consumption decisions and, therefore,
they are less likely to produce as great of marginal utility from such tax savings.
As a result, so the argument would go, the tax system should potentially
distribute tax savings away from them. See Fennell, supra note 148, at 1394-97
(discussing this argument in the context of tax policy toward willpower); see also
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV.
745, 784-85 (2007) (examining argument in the context of savers, when savings
may indicate higher ability generally or may indicate high ability as a
consumer). Defending this argument, though, depends on a tricky relationship
between poor decision makers likely being less well off (and therefore starting
with lower utility and presumably higher marginal utility) and their potential
lower ability to turn tax savings into marginal utility to the same extent as a
better (and likely better-off) decision maker. Making a serious determination of
whether social welfare (as measured by some function of individual utilities)
improves as a result of distributing tax savings away from poor decision makers,
given this tricky relationship, is likely difficult or impossible. As a result, the
policy decision ultimately comes down to whether it is reasonable to impose
greater tax burdens on those with lower decision making capacity. Again, the
reasonableness of such a policy is simply difficult to defend, even if some might
argue it is defensible. At the least, we should be considering more seriously
cases in which frictions, as screening mechanisms, raise these sorts of questions.
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higher marginal tax rates.150 For example, take a taxpayer
(Taxpayer H) in the 35% marginal tax bracket and another
taxpayer (Taxpayer L) in the 15% marginal tax bracket.
When Taxpayer H gets to exclude $100 from income, the
value to Taxpayer H of doing so is $100 x .35 = $35. When
Taxpayer L gets to exclude $100 from income, the value to
Taxpayer L of doing so is $100 x .15 = $15. The same
exclusion is worth less to Taxpayer L than Taxpayer H,
simply because of their marginal tax brackets. This analysis
is true for investments in flexible spending accounts as well.
Since investing in flexible spending accounts means that
the amount of the investment is excluded from the
taxpayer’s income, taxpayers in higher marginal tax
brackets gain more from the exclusion than taxpayers in
lower marginal tax brackets. Given the progressive nature
of the income tax schedule, this means that higher income
individuals have more to gain from investing in flexible
spending accounts than do lower income individuals.
Importantly, the use-it-or-lose-it rule makes this
discrepancy even worse. As a result of the use-it-or-lose-it
rule, lower income taxpayers not only have less to gain from
investing in flexible spending accounts, they also have more
to lose. This can best be understood by using the same
running example. Imagine that Taxpayers H and L both
invest $100 in a flexible spending account. Now imagine
that each of Taxpayers H and L fail to use $10 of the
amounts invested in their flexible spending accounts. The
cost to taxpayers of any amounts forfeited pursuant to the
use-it-or-lose-it provision is the amount forfeited x (1 - the
marginal tax rate).151 As a result, the cost to Taxpayer H of
forfeiting $10 is $10 x .65 = $6.50. The cost to Taxpayer L of
150. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency & Tax Incentives: The Case
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006).
151. The explanation for this is straightforward. Had the taxpayer not
invested the funds in the flexible spending account (and forfeited them), the
taxpayer would have had to pay tax equal to the amount forfeited x the
marginal tax rate. So, by forfeiting the funds, the taxpayer only loses the
amount forfeited x (1 - the marginal tax rate). State and local income taxes and
FICA taxes are also avoided by investing in flexible spending accounts. These
taxes are ignored for the purposes of this analysis because they do not affect the
conclusions, which follow from the federal income tax rates.
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forfeiting $10 is $10 x .85 = $8.50. Taxpayer L, the lower
income taxpayer, not only has less to gain from investing in
the flexible spending account, but also has more to lose
because of the use-it-or-lose-it friction.152
Indeed, the statistics regarding taxpayers’ usage of
flexible spending accounts seem to reflect how the use-it-orlose-it rule disproportionately burdens poorer decision
makers and lower income individuals. Researchers have
found that highly educated and high income taxpayers are
the primary users of flexible spending accounts and that
being in a higher marginal tax bracket is strongly
associated with increased participation in flexible spending
accounts.153 This finding is in line with the analysis above.
As a friction, the use-it-or-lose-it rule necessarily imposes
152. Taking risk aversion into account complicates the analysis. If individuals
are assumed to have decreasing absolute risk aversion, then, counterfactually
assuming a proportional income tax, flexible spending account investment may
decline with income. The reason is because, under these assumptions, as income
increases, the marginal utility of consumption declines. As a result, the
marginal benefit of tax savings from investing in a flexible spending account
decreases. Cardon & Showalter, Flexible Spending Accounts as Insurance, supra
note 147, at 49-50. However, this analysis is both inconsistent with the actual,
progressive tax rate structure, and with actual evidence of higher income
individuals using flexible spending accounts to a greater extent (discussed in
text below). As a result, at least in practice, higher income taxpayers having
greater absolute dollars to gain and less to lose as a result of higher marginal
tax rates does, indeed, appear to make flexible spending account investment
more valuable for them, as suggested by the analysis in the text. Moreover,
some models explain why higher income taxpayers should invest in flexible
spending accounts to a greater extent, even controlling for marginal tax rates.
See, e.g., Barton H. Hamilton & James Marton, Employee Choice of Flexible
Spending Account Participation and Health Plan, 17 HEALTH ECON. 793, 803
(2008) (relying on income effect, which causes higher income taxpayers to have
higher optimal health-care expenditures, which dominates reduced risk aversion
by higher income taxpayers).
153. Roger Feldman & Jennifer Schultz, Who Uses Flexible Spending
Accounts: Effects of Employee Characteristics and Employer Strategies, 39 MED.
CARE 661 (2001); Hamilton & Marton, supra note 152, at 802-03. Additionally,
researchers have determined that, after controlling for other demographic
characteristics, non-white taxpayers tend to use flexible spending accounts less
than white taxpayers. The study does not appear to define white or non-white.
The study speculates about some potential reasons for this finding, but more
investigation would be needed in order to make any conclusions. Hamilton &
Marton, supra note 152, at 802-03.
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greater costs on some taxpayers than on others. However,
even if the friction serves as a powerful deterrence vehicle
on tax planning as a general matter, it is screening for more
than tax planning motivation in a manner that is
problematic at best and highly perverse at worst. Viewing
frictions as screening mechanisms is the key to unearthing
these perversities.
Additionally, understanding the screening problems
with the use-it-or-lose-it rule suggests potential reforms.
Congress has in recent years repeatedly considered reform
of the flexible spending account rules,154 and the IRS is
currently considering potential changes to the use-it-or-loseit rule.155 An easy fix to the use-it-or-lose-it rule’s screening
problems would be to eliminate it entirely. However, doing
so would undermine any value that the rule may have as a
deterrence vehicle. If the government wants to keep some
limit on the broad use of flexible spending accounts as a tax
154. See, e.g., H.R. 3105, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing to allow carry forward
of up to $2,000 of health care flexible spending account funds, inclusion in
income at time of carry forward, and distributions of amounts in later years
(along with interest on such amounts, which interest would be included as
ordinary income, presumably at the time of the distribution)); H.R. 63, 107th
Cong. (2001) (proposing to allow distribution of unused flexible spending
amounts, which would then be included in income). Other legislative proposals,
with slightly different perspectives, have also been put forth. See, e.g., H.R.
2114, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing allowing rollovers of unused health care
flexible spending amounts to Archer MSAs); H.R. 4804, 107th Cong. (2002)
(proposing allowing a carry forward of up to $500 of unused health care flexible
spending amounts, or distributions (which distributions would be subject to
tax)); H.R. 167, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing carryover of up to $3,000 of
unused flexible spending amounts, which could also be rolled over into various
tax-advantaged accounts).
155. Recently, in light of longtime questions about the use-it-or-lose-it rule and
a new $2,500 annual cap (indexed for inflation) that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act placed on contributions to health care flexible spending
accounts, the IRS has suggested that it is reconsidering the use-it-or-lose-it rule,
at least in the limited context of health care flexible spending accounts. See
I.R.S. Notice 12-40, 2012-26 I.R.B. 1046, 1046. The gist of the IRS’s
reconsideration seems to be that the annual cap may lower the value of any tax
deferral enough so that the use-it-or-lose-it rule is less necessary. Indeed, Notice
2012-40 states that “[t]he $2,500 limit, while not addressing the ‘use-or-lose’
rule, limits the potential for using health FSAs to defer compensation and the
extent to which salary reduction amounts may accumulate over time.” Id. at
1047.
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planning vehicle, then another solution is needed, one
which should be sensitive to secondary screening problems.
For example, consider the following alternative friction,
called the “use-it-or-pay-a-penalty” rule. Under this rule,
taxpayers could retrieve any unused funds, subject to a
penalty (in addition to the regular income and other taxes
that would now be owed on the salary income). The penalty
would be equal to the amount of funds retrieved, multiplied
by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.156 This use-it-or-pay-apenalty friction would serve a number of goals. First, from a
screening perspective, ideally any applicable friction would
be more costly as a taxpayer’s tax planning motivation
increased. As a general matter, a taxpayer’s inclination to
use flexible spending accounts broadly to turn taxable
salary into nontaxed income likely increases as the
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate increases (and the value of the
exclusion from income therefore increases). By tying the
strength of the friction to a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate,
the use-it-or-pay-a-penalty rule would indeed make the
friction on tax planning stronger as a taxpayer’s marginal
tax rate (and therefore likely tax planning motivation)
increases. Second, the use-it-or-pay-a-penalty friction would
not suffer from the same secondary screening infirmities as
the use-it-or-lose-it rule. Since the friction now would apply
a penalty equal to the amount retrieved x marginal tax rate,
the friction would become less costly as a taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate declined. As a result, the friction should
tend to impose lower, rather than disproportionately higher,
burdens on lower income taxpayers. Additionally, the
calculus regarding whether or not to invest in a flexible
spending account (and how much to invest) should become
simpler when the potential penalty for investing funds and
156. This would change the size of the penalty taxpayers face relative to the
use-it-or-lose-it rule. For example, under the use-it-or-lose-it rule, a taxpayer in
the 30% marginal tax bracket would lose $70 as a result of investing $100 in a
flexible spending account and not using it. Under the use-it-or-pay-a-penalty
rule, the taxpayer would lose $30, on top of income taxes owed of $30. Since
there is no reason to think that the existing friction has deterrence set just right
through the $70 penalty, the use-it-or-pay-a-penalty rule is preferable since, as
described in the text, it ameliorates the use-it-or-lose-it rule’s screening
perversities.
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not using them (the amount invested x marginal tax rate)
equals the benefit from investing the funds and using them
(the amount invested x marginal tax rate).157 Indeed, the
use-it-or-pay-a-penalty rule should allow taxpayers to make
a relatively straightforward determination about whether or
not to invest based simply on the likelihood of using the
funds. As a result, the use-it-or-pay-a-penalty rule should
lessen the disproportionately greater burden placed on
poorer decision makers. Understanding how frictions
function as screening mechanisms thereby can help
preserve a friction on broad flexible spending account use
(to the extent it is desirable to do so), while minimizing
perverse screening costs.
3. Additional Applications. The examples of the wash
sale rule and the use-it-or-lose-it rule offer basic principles
that can be extended across the tax code. Namely, these two
examples illustrate how frictions impose different costs on
different taxpayers and ideally impose higher costs on tax
planners, but the examples also show that frictions may
track other taxpayer characteristics in undesirable ways.
Asking whether a friction is reasonably imposing costs
relative to the level of tax planning motivation or
unreasonably imposing costs relative to other underlying
characteristics can elucidate problems with frictions and
can suggest ways to fix the problems that would not
otherwise be apparent.
As an example of this methodology, take the strategic
application of tax law uncertainty as a means of deterring
tax planning. Scholars have suggested that uncertainty can

157. Reducing complexity arguably weakens the friction’s role as a deterrence
vehicle. For discussion of the tradeoff between deterrence and screening, see
supra text accompanying notes 105-107. In this case, reducing the deterrence of
the friction as a side-effect of reducing the perverse screening impact seems
justifiable. The friction does still exist and does still act as a deterrence vehicle.
It also still screens, by imposing relatively higher costs on those taxpayers
attempting to use frictions as a broad tax planning vehicle (rather than simply a
form of insurance). As a secondary screening effect, it also will still impose
relatively higher costs on taxpayers relatively less sure of their health and
dependent care needs, but this appears to be a much more innocuous secondary
screening effect.
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play a role in deterring tax planning.158 On the other hand,
the IRS in recent years has unrolled a concerted program
aimed at reducing uncertainty for large business taxpayers,
a group of taxpayers often engaged in very aggressive tax
planning. Specifically, the IRS now offers large business
taxpayers a suite of guidance programs explicitly designed
to provide them with increased certainty regarding their tax
liability prior to tax return filing.159 So what explains this
disconnect between scholarly support for uncertainty as a
friction and the IRS’s efforts to ameliorate uncertainty
through guidance programs? While scholars have focused on
the arguable utility of uncertainty as a deterrence vehicle, it
is problematic from a screening perspective. Understanding
the dual role of frictions as deterrence vehicles and
screening mechanisms suggests ways to make uncertainty
more viable as a friction by sharpening its screening
abilities.
As an initial matter, uncertainty can be used as a
friction because it relies on nontax costs to make tax
planning more difficult or costly. As scholars have argued,
taxpayers who wish to engage in tax planning in the face of
uncertain tax law cannot know exactly what they need to do
to ensure that they will obtain their desirable tax
outcome.160 Uncertainty therefore can impose extra costs on
these tax planners by forcing them to add extra bells and

158. See, e.g., Tim Edgar, Financial Instability, Tax Policy, and the Tax
Expenditure Concept, 63 SMU L. REV. 969, 1013 (2010) (describing tax law
uncertainty as “an additional friction that constrains tax-driven innovation” in
the context of publicly traded securities).
159. For a more comprehensive description of these programs and the IRS’s
new certainty initiatives, see Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive
Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121 (2012) [hereinafter Osofsky, Some
Realism].
160. The assumption here is that, under clear tax law, tax planners would
simply be able to meet the requirements in order to obtain the desirable tax
outcome. If the tax planning could be proscribed by clear tax law, then
uncertainty would not be necessary as a friction and, indeed, may encourage tax
planning as a result of potential uncertainty seeking and the lower prospect of
penalties under uncertain law. See Osofsky, The Case Against, supra note 94, at
497 n.29 (suggesting as much).
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whistles to their transactions in order to gain a higher level
of certainty of desirable tax treatment.161
However, a problem with uncertainty as a friction is
that it does not impose costs systematically relative to the
level of tax planning motivation. In other words, even when
uncertainty is valuable as a deterrence vehicle, it does not
function well as a screening mechanism on tax planning.
Applying
the
screening
mechanism
terminology,
uncertainty cannot reasonably be seen as a tag or ordeal for
tax planning motivation because it does not systematically
track characteristics of tax planners. As a general matter,
individuals tend to exhibit a phenomenon known as
“uncertainty aversion,” whereby individuals tend to avoid
uncertainty, or unknown probabilities.162 Not only taxpayers
engaged in wasteful tax planning schemes are likely to find
uncertainty costly. Taxpayers, as a general matter, are
likely to find an increasingly uncertain tax code, and
concomitant uncertainty regarding tax liabilities, to be
costly. This is particularly true in the large business
context, in which large business taxpayers face reporting
requirements that depend upon the certainty of their tax
positions.163 Moreover, some evidence suggests that
taxpayers with the strongest tax positions, least likely to be
overturned, are the most likely to find uncertainty
particularly costly.164 Taxpayers with the strongest tax
161. For some discussions of uncertainty in this regard see, for example,
James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles,
55 TAX L. REV. 135, 165 (2002) (suggesting that uncertainty may be used to stop
“excessively tax-driven transactions,” albeit after distinguishing between
uncertainty and a narrower conception of “frictions”); Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure
and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in
TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 241-42 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 2008)
(discussing how uncertainty can increase frictional impediments, or “back-flips,”
required to deter aggressive tax planning).
162. See Sarah Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1065-66 (2009).
163. In particular, see FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERPRETATION NO. 48:
ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES (2006), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FIN48.pdf.
164. See Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk
Information on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
360, 387-88 (1991) (finding uncertainty aversion in the reporting context when
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positions are often going to be engaging in routine business
transactions, rather than aggressive tax planning. As a
result, increasing tax law uncertainty potentially imposes
greater costs on routine business transactions than on
aggressive tax planning. Making the tax code more costly to
taxpayers in general, and in particular to taxpayers more
likely engaging in routine business transactions rather than
aggressive tax planning, does not direct costs well based on
tax planning motivation.
Understanding the screening aspect of frictions can help
ameliorate these shortcomings by suggesting ways to make
uncertainty a more tailored friction on tax planning. For
example, the IRS could couple its offers of certainty through
guidance (and accompanying certainty regarding tax
liabilities) with requirements likely to restrict such
certainty to taxpayers that are generally engaged in routine
business transactions. In particular, the IRS could restrict
any guidance to taxpayers that met certain criteria over the
course of a specified time period prior to the guidance
request including: paying at least a certain percentage of
taxes relative to pre-tax income, not having engaged in any
tax shelters or abusive transactions, etc.165 Taxpayers
engaging in routine business transactions should be more
likely eligible for guidance under these criteria, and
therefore more able to reduce the costs to them of
uncertainty, without completely undermining the potential
value of uncertainty as a friction on taxpayers engaging in
more aggressive tax planning. Additionally, the IRS could
offer more nonbinding and informal, but publicly available,
guidance about how the tax law applies in routine business
transactions. As a result, the guidance, even though
nonbinding on the IRS, could serve as comfort for taxpayers
engaging in routine business transactions. At the same
experimental taxpayers faced favorable probability estimates regarding
probability of detection and penalties).
165. The IRS would have to consider the resource costs of providing guidance
to these taxpayers. See Osofsky, Some Realism, supra note 159, for a discussion
of this concern. The IRS could address these costs in a number of ways,
including fee collection in exchange for guidance, publishing redacted forms of
guidance more routinely in order to reduce requests regarding similar, routine
transactions, etc.
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time, such guidance would do little to reduce the
uncertainty facing taxpayers engaging in aggressive tax
planning transactions.166 While clearly the details of any of
these proposals would need to be fleshed out and costs and
benefits would have to be weighed,167 uncertainty alone is
simply too blunt of a tool. Focusing on screening offers a
more productive path forward.
CONCLUSION
As I illustrate in this Article, we need to integrate an
important, new concept into the design of tax law. Frictions,
or costs on tax planning, exist throughout the tax code.
While the existing scholarship focuses primarily on the
deterrence aspect of these frictions, they also have an
important screening function. This basic insight complicates
conventional wisdom regarding how to evaluate frictions
and suggests concrete reforms of existing tax law.
166. Currently, IRS guidance is either of the type that taxpayers generally can
rely upon it (such as revenue rulings) or of the type that only the taxpayer
actually receiving the guidance can rely upon on it (such as letter rulings and
other informal guidance). Taxpayers are already warned that “since each
Revenue Ruling represents the conclusion of the Service as to the application of
the law to the entire state of facts involved, taxpayers, Service personnel, and
others concerned are cautioned against reaching the same conclusion in other
cases unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the same.” Treas.
Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e) (as amended in 1987). However, such limitations have
not succeeded in preventing tax planners from using IRS guidance in an
unanticipated manner. See Eustice, supra note 161, at 143-44 (discussing
phenomenon). The nonbinding nature of guidance, suggested in the text, may
provide the Service more leverage to prevent guidance from being used in such a
manner.
167. Immediate concerns include questions such as: exactly what should the
cutoff of taxes paid relative to pretax income be? What taxpayers might this
unfairly exclude or include? What should the definition of “tax shelter” be for
these purposes? Who makes these determinations? Are the resource costs in
making these determinations worth any benefit they create? These concerns
may be ameliorated to the extent that the IRS is exercising its rights to offer or
deny guidance based on whatever taxpayer characteristics it chooses and it is
simply making those characteristics more explicit. In any event, this Article
certainly does not mean to answer all these questions or ultimately endorse
these particular ideas. Rather, the Article offers examples of the types of ideas
that we might consider after closely examining uncertainty as not just a
deterrence vehicle but also a screening mechanism.
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Frictions, when properly constructed, can serve as
screening mechanisms on tax planning, ideally placing
relatively greater costs on taxpayers more engaged in such
planning. Constructing frictions without recognizing their
fundamental role as screening mechanisms can result in
particular groups of taxpayers bearing higher costs in
unintended and perverse ways. In contrast, understanding
frictions as screening mechanisms can improve their
screening function, or, alternatively, suggest that screening
effects make the friction altogether undesirable. In any
event, exploring how frictions screen between different
taxpayers is a crucial, but currently underappreciated,
dimension of tax law design.
Viewing frictions as screening mechanisms raises many
future lines of analysis. As an initial matter, many other
frictions across the tax code can and should be examined as
screening mechanisms, thereby raising a whole series of
questions about how and why such frictions are screening.
Viewing frictions as screening mechanisms also raises
additional empirical questions. For example, how has the
nature of stockholding changed since the 1921 Revenue Act?
How might this affect the ideal wash sale rule? How might
the use-it-or-lose-it rule be screening for demographic
characteristics other than those explored in detail in this
Article and what might this mean for the use-it-or-lose-it
rule? Moreover, recognizing frictions as screening
mechanisms raises a number of potentially far reaching
theoretical questions. How, exactly, should various welfare
weights (or costs) be assigned to different screening
outcomes? When should taxpayers themselves bear the
administrative costs of screening mechanisms and might
their doing so help deter tax planning? For example, as to
the latter question, if taxpayers ultimately found to have no
economic substance for a transaction had to bear the cost of
trial fees to determine economic substance, would this rule
be disproportionately costly to aggressive tax planners,
thereby helping to deter such planning?
In sum, once we recognize that frictions serve as
screening mechanisms, there is a whole line of analysis that
we should undergo. Scholars have done extremely valuable
work examining when frictions deter tax planning rather
than causing it to go through in a more wasteful fashion.
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But frictions do more than fulfill this role as deterrence
vehicles. This Article has highlighted the other,
underappreciated role of frictions as screening mechanisms.
Frictions impose substantial costs on taxpayers throughout
the tax code. It is time to ask, in a rigorous way, how
different groups of taxpayers are bearing these costs
differently, based on underlying characteristics, and how
these differences should affect tax law design.

